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ABSTRACT
THE CASE OF THE MINE BAN TREATY: UNDERSTANDING THE DOMESTIC 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE DIFFUSION OF DISARMAMENT NORMS
Güneş Özlem Öztürk
M.A. in Political Science Program, Thesis, 2012
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Halit Mustafa Tagma
Keywords: International norms, Landmines, Transnational advocacy networks, Human 
rights, Disarmament, Small and light weapons
As the pace of the globalization increased after the end of the Cold War, international non-
governmental organizations became more influential in world politics through transnational 
advocacy  networks  (TANs)  that  arose  from  their  cooperation  with  domestic  non-
governmental organizations. Until recently, these networks have only been active in issues 
of “low politics”. With the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, we have seen that TANs are also able to 
influence  security  and  foreign  policies  of  states  towards  complying  with  international 
humanitarian norms; however, little research was carried out to disclose the conditions that 
enable these networks to influence policy change in the security domain. For this purpose, 
this thesis aims to distinguish these conditions under which the global network against the 
use of anti-personnel landmine, namely International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), 
has failed to mobilize states to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.  I  test  two explanatory 
variables from domestic politics approach, crisis level and domestic impact of the norm 
against  anti-personnel  landmines,  through  qualitative  comparative  case  studies  between 
United States, Turkey and Cuba. The study shows that although domestic impact of the 
mine-ban norm does not seem to have a direct effect, the crisis level variable appears as a  
factor directly blocking or giving way to the ICBL in its efforts influencing state behaviors 
towards the Mine Ban Treaty. 
vi
ÖZET
MAYIN YASAĞI ANLAŞMASI: SİLAHSIZLANMA NORMLARININ 
YAYILIMINI ETKİLEYEN İÇ ETMENLERİ ANLAMAK
Güneş Özlem Öztürk
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2012
Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Halit Mustafa Tagma
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası normlar, Karamayını, Ulusaşırı yandaşlık ağbağları, 
İnsan hakları, Silahsızlanma, Küçük ve hafif silahlar
Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimiyle hız kazanan küreselleşmeyle uluslararası devlet dışı  kuruluşlar 
yerel kuruluşlarla işbirlikleri sonucu oluşturdukları ulusaşırı yandaşlık ağbağları (UYA) ile 
küresel siyasette daha etkin olmaya başlamıştır. Yakın zamana kadar, bu ağbağlar sadece 
“düşük  düzeyli  siyaset”da  faaldi.  Uluslararası  Mayın  Karşıtı  Kampanya'nın  (UMKK) 
çabalarıyla 1997'de imzalanan Mayın Yasağı Anlaşması ile UYA'ların ülkelerin güvenlik ve 
dış siyasetlerine de etki edebildiği görüşmüştür; ancak,  güvenlik alanında hangi koşullar 
altında  bu  ağbağların  siyaset  değişimine  neden  olduğuna  yönelik  çalışmalar  azdır.  Bu 
nedenle,  bu  tez  UMKK'nın  ülkelerin  Mayın  Yasağı  Anlaşması'nı  imzalamasına  yönelik 
çabalarının hangi koşullar altında yetersiz kaldığını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. İç siyaset 
yaklaşımından iki açıklayıcı değişken, kriz seviyesi ve mayın karşıtı normun iç siyasetteki 
önemi,  Amerika  Birleşik  Devletleri,  Türkiye  ve  Küba  arasında  yapılan  karşılaştırmalı 
niteliksel  vaka  analizi  ile  test  edilmektedir.  Çalışmanın  sonucunda,  kriz  seviyesi 
değişkeninin  Uluslararası  Mayın  Karşıtı  Kampanya'nın  çabalarına  doğrudan  etki  ettiği 
ancak mayın karşıtı normun herhangi bir doğrudan etkisinin olmadığı gözlenmiştir.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
After  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  international  non-governmental  organizations 
(INGOs) had a more active role in international relations. In an international system in 
which main actors  were states,  international  institutions  and international  and domestic 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) succeeded to create a room for themselves. As the 
pace of globalization increased in this period, advocates of social, political or economic 
justice  became  influential  beyond  the  national  borders  they  were  founded.  Through 
cooperation with other INGOs, domestic NGOs created unique networks that enable social 
change by means of lobbying, agenda setting, and issue framing. These networks have been 
called transnational  advocacy networks  (TANs) in  the  International  Relations  literature. 
International norms diffused by these networks have had an increasing affect to shape state 
behavior. These networks have been successful in pressuring governments to comply with 
international norms in the past.  One important  recent example has been in  the field of 
international  security.  In  the  late  1990's,  non-governmental  organizations  and  several 
middle  states  initiated  a  campaign that  denounced the  use  of  anti-personnel  landmines 
(APMs), claiming that their  humanitarian cost far outweighs their  military benefit.  This 
initiative later concluded with a treaty, namely the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. This treaty has 
been seen as a great success for NGO advocacy and the spread of humanitarian norms, as 
they have been able to influence “high politics,” in other words, the security and foreign 
policy-making of the state. To date, 160 states have become parties to the treaty, while 36 
states still have not committed to the treaty. 
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While the pressure that TANs put on states is an important source of influence, not 
every state is equally affected by this; therefore, states’ socialization to the norm does not 
happen equally across the board. Some states are more responsive to international pressures 
whereas  others  resist  their  influence.  The  established  literature  that  focuses  on  the 
conditions  under  which  TANs  exert  their  influence  mainly  focuses  on  human  rights, 
environmental issues, or economic agendas, which is generally referred to as “low politics.” 
In the security domain, however, little research is carried out on the conditions under which 
TANs can or do cause policy change. 
This thesis aims to understand the reasons why TANs fail in their effort to mobilize 
states  to  implement  humanitarian  disarmament  treaties.  The  findings  of  this  thesis  are 
intended to give us an insight not just about the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) but also other 
small arms treaties, such as Convention on Cluster Munitions. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish the factors  that  facilitate  or  hinder  the efforts  of  the transnational  mine-ban 
advocacy network, namely International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The task of 
identifying the factors that  interfere in  the relationship between TANs and target states 
during norm diffusion is possible through a comparative study between the states that are 
party and states that are not party to the treaty and studying the differences in experiences 
of each. Many studies in norm research either focus on good norms or cases in which the 
norms  are  accepted.  These  are  called  positive  cases.  In  this  thesis,  both  positive  and 
negative cases are under investigation. As the positive case, Turkey, and as negative cases, 
USA and  Cuba  has  been  selected.  A comparative  approach  to  contrast  the  differing 
domestic  contexts  will  reveal  much  more  insight  about  the  nature  of  the  relationship 
between TANs and target states. 
In  order  to  present  the  argument  in  a  theoretical  framework,  I  look  at  several 
International  Relations  theories.  Mainstream IR theories,  however,  are  not  sufficient  to 
account for the case of Mine Ban Treaty, and thus to explain why ICBL failed to exert 
influence  on  some states.  Thus,  I  employ explanatory variables  from domestic  politics 
approach to understand the underlying factors that have blocked or smoothed the way for 
ICBL about norm diffusion. Two domestic factors, crisis level and domestic impact of the 
norm, are proposed in this thesis. The measurement of domestic impact of landmine norm 
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is partly related with political, social and legal internalization of the norm. As the literature 
suggests, the most important of all three is the social internalization of the norm. One of 
many reasons why global landmine ban movement succeeded so much lies in its ability to 
create partnerships with local and other international NGOs. The relationship between local 
and international actors is also dependent on the domestic structure of the country.  For 
example, if the country has a state-above-society domestic structure where in which the 
civil society actors are strangled with the central authority, then it will be harder for TANs 
to ally with domestic NGOs, especially in a field such as disarmament and arms control. As 
a result, this thesis argues that any improvements in crisis level and domestic impact of 
norm in a country is crucial. When crisis level is low and impact level is high, then the 
country is expected to be fully open to the influence of TANs. Theoretically, this in turn 
increases the likelihood of a country to sign the treaty.
The success of trantaional advocacy networks in the formation and signing of the 
MBT have greatly encouraged other international campaigns with humanitarian concerns. 
For example, the Control Arms Campaign initiated in 2006 led to further discussions of an 
international treaty that regulates the trade of conventional weapons. Within the field of 
international  security studies,  humanitarian disarmament and arms control  is  a  growing 
field for academics. Humanitarian disarmament is an important study field to understand 
disarmament  treaties  in  this  day  and  century  for  both  academics,  policy-makers  and 
activists alike. To this end, this thesis investigates the topic under the scope of small arms 
disarmament.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND THE MINE BAN TREATY
The  Mine  Ban  Treaty  is  the  primary  example  for  humanitarian  small  arms 
disarmament. In order to fully grasp the importance of the treaty and how it differs from 
other disarmament treaties, a history of the process that gave birth to the Mine Ban Treaty 
will be given in this chapter. This will also help us understand why the Mine Ban Treaty is  
an ideal case to study the variation of transnational advocacy networks' influence on states. 
Apart  from  this,  literature  about  norms  and  how  they  diffuse,  provides  necessary 
background before presenting the argument of this thesis.
2.1. International Norm Diffusion
In the literature, a norm is defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors 
with  a  given  identity.”1 This  thesis,  partly relying  on  constructivist  premises,  views 
international community as a social system of states. Therefore, the the thesis assumes that 
international affairs  is also influenced by international norms. In this  system, states are 
open to be affected by other states and other non-state channels. One of these channels is 
the  'transnational  advocacy  networks'  (TANs)  -networks  that  include  international 
1 Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change. International Organization 52(04): 887-917; Florini, Ann. 1996. The 
Evolution of International Norms. International Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-389.
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organizations, local, national and global NGOs that work to influence and change a state’s 
policy  towards  a  common  goal  about  a  political,  social  or  economic  issue.  As  TANs 
promote  international  norms  and  initiate  the  process  of  norm diffusion,  sthe  tates  are 
influenced by them. This thesis  aims to contribute the literature by examining possible 
conditions under which TANs are able to exert their influence. 
The origin and diffusion of norms have been a source of theoretical discussion in the 
international  relations literature.  Where some scholars argue that norms come from the 
international system, others argue that norms originate from the domestic level. According 
to Dominguez:
   “Diffusion comes into play when international norms are trickled down 
to the national level which in turn leads to domestic change; this is a top-
down process, in which international norms influence the action of actors 
in the domestic arena. For instance changes in human rights norms on an 
international level stimulate domestic change. On the other, diffusion may 
happen  as  a  bottom-up  process,  whereby  national  norm  advancement 
precedes or even drives international norm development.”2 
The  Mine  Ban  Treaty  case  is  an  example  of  the  former,  where  the  mine-ban 
movement has started at the international level and mobilized states to sign and implement 
the treaty. Finnemore and Sikkink explains in detail how international norms emerge and 
come to influence domestic politics in what they call as the “norm life cycle” model.3 In 
this  model,  there are three steps. The first  step is “norm emergence” which refers to a 
critical mass of states embracing a new norm. Second step is called “norm cascade” and 
includes  the  socialization  of  non-conforming states  into  norm followers  by persuasion, 
even if there is no internal pressure on states. And the final step refers to the process of the 
2 Roberto Dominguez, “Diffusion of EU Norms in Latin America: The Cases of Mexico, 
Venezuela and Honduras,” Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Report SeriesVol. 10 No. 1, 
February 2010. 
3 Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change. International Organization 52(04): 887-917;Florini, Ann. 1996. The 
Evolution of International Norms. International Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-389.
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internalization of norms in which the norms are further  habituated.4 As a result  of  the 
second step, the norm is legally institutionalized in the country and states become a norm 
follower. In this thesis, norm diffusion is specifically used for this process in which states 
are persuaded to be  a “norm follower.” The first indication of becoming a norm follower is 
the adoption of norm's terms by the state. Therefore, for the norm against anti-personnel 
landmines, states which signed the Mine Ban Treaty can be counted as norm followers. 
This thesis  approaches norm diffusion in the sense of fulfilling this second step of the 
“norm life cycle.” Further improvements towards the norm implies internalization of the 
norm. On the other hand, norm internalization (step 3) means more than a policy change as 
in the step 2. When the state and the society take further steps with intention to comply 
with the norm's tenets. 
2.2 Norm Setting in Humanitarian Arms Control
The concept of humanitarian arms control gained momentum in late 20th century 
with principal agreements due to the changing security environment and exigencies after 
the end of the Cold War. Poverty, unemployment, illegal migration, emergence of failed 
states, misuse of small arms by non-state groups during and following the cases of internal 
conflicts, and terrorism in general sense were the primary challenges in the new era. These 
new challenges required a different kind of arms control and disarmament. To this end, 
primarily transnational campaigns and secondarily some like minded middle-sized states 
began to  introduce the  indiscriminate  lethal  effects  of  unexploded remnants  of  war  on 
civilians as a part of states' security agenda.The principal agreements in the field were the 
4  Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (2002). “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change.”  Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics. Eds. P. J. 
Katzenstein, R. O.Keohane and S. D. Krasner. Cambridge, MA; London: the MIT Press: 
243-277
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1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(PoA) and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munition. 
Humanitarian arms control is a shift in arms control and disarmament in today's 
world. Humanitarin arms control differs from conventional arms control in certain respects. 
First of all,  unlike conventional arms control, such as the examples of SALTs illustrate, 
humanitarian  arms  control  is  not  initated  by  superpowers,  nor  is  designed  to  be  a 
Machiavellian move on the grand chessboard of realpolitik. Secondly, humanitarian arms 
control often times advance despite the initial, and in some cases, enduring opposition of 
major powers. Third, unlike conventional arms control, the initiatives in humanitarian arms 
control  are  carried  primarily  by  non-governmental  organizations.  These  groups  try  to 
relocate the arms control issues from its national security domain to a human rights base 
where  they  can  have  more  legitimacy  to  interfere  in  discussions  as  experts.5 Fourth, 
humanitarian arms control seeks to eliminate and/or alleviate not only focuses on the short 
terms but also aims to reduce the long-term ill effects of weapons. 
The involvement of NGOs to the process paved the way  to a new understanding of 
state security. The concept of human security, which attaches importance to the quality of a 
person's life through promoting necessary means to provide people economically, socially 
and  politically  a  safer  life,  began  to  challenge  the  long-lived  national  security 
understanding.  Humanitarian  arms  control  shares  the  agenda  of  human  security  in  the 
security sector. This specific agenda not only requires elimination or limitation of the use of 
certain weapons, but also  ensuring the necessary rehabilitation and assistance the victims 
should get. Therefore, the fundamentals of humanitarian arms control is not just attacking 
the source of the small arms problem by call for the ban of its use, but also dealing with the  
blight it has caused. That's why, the norm development in landmine ban movement, as well 
as in other fields, was based on the observations and first  hand experiences of civilian 
suffering due to the improper use of the weapon. There is still a need for further norm 
5 Diana O'Dwyer, “First landmines, now small arms?: The International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines as a Model for Small-Arms Advocacy,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, 
17 (2006): 77-97. p. 89
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development  and  institutions  in  humanitarian  arms  control.  The  Arms  Trade  Treaty,  a 
possible prospective agreement to control the illegal trafficking of weapons, could become 
an important step in this regard.6 Along with these developments, there is also an increasing 
need for studies that focus on the issue. This thesis aims to provide an explanation and 
further understanding in the field within the framework of its research question. 
2.3 Anti-Personnel Landmines
Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty provides the definition of anti-personnel mines 
(APMs): 
   “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or 
more persons.  Mines designed to be detonated by the presence,  proximity or 
contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling 
devices,  are  not  considered  anti-personnel  mines  as  a  result  of  being  so 
equipped. 
The  main  function  of  anti-personnel  mines  was  designed  to  compensate  the 
weaknesses of anti-tank mines (ATM) that intended to destroy battle tanks and enemy army 
vehicles. On their own, the anti-tank mines are visible from a distance by foot soldiers and 
can be easily picked up by enemy forces to be used again in their own minefields. To secure 
the location of ATMs, researchers developed a special mine to prevent people from go near 
the ATMs and steal the mine. These new series of landmines, called APMs, were intended 
to maim the foot soldiers instead of killing them. The logic behind was that the wounded 
soldiers both delayed the advance of the enemy by imposing a burden on support service,  
and  the  incidents  also  impaired  the  morale  of  rest  of  the  soldiers.  Their  'popularity'  
6 Simone Wisotzki,  “Between Morality  and Military Interests,”  PRIF Reports  No.  92, 
2009.
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increased during the Second World War where early mines, that exploded with weight of 
the person who treads on them, were used. Conventional APMs also injure bystanders with 
scatterings of shrapnel. During the Cold War, landmines have become an integral part in 
the arsenals of states, and they have undergone a number of technological improvements 
over time. To prevent detection, new versions included either very few metals or no metal 
parts. If the mine is metal-free, then it is called “plastic mine.” Such mines make it very 
hard for demining units to clear the mined areas and open them for agricultural use in the 
aftermath of the war. Today, they are used to block the movement of opposition forces and 
to protect military units. Roughly 75% of all remaining landmines on the ground are APMs. 
APMs' low cost and effectiveness made them an important tool in the eyes of the 
military strategists. According to the  Red Cross, however, military experts studied 26 wars 
over the past 55 years about the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines in 
1996. This study concluded that the use of mines does not give a strategical advantage to 
military forces during military engagement.7 On the contrary, mines do more damage to 
civilian lives than they block movements of enemy forces. Due to their indiscriminate and 
victim-triggered  operation,  and  their  durability,  mines  cause  excessive  side  effects  on 
civilians. 
2.4 Ottawa Process and The Mine Ban Treaty
Today, the Mine Ban Treaty is the primary humanitarian arms control treaty with 
160 states party to it. It comprehensively bans the use, production, transfer and stockpiling 
of APMs and requires the destruction of the stockpiled munition within four years and 
removal of the APMs from the ground within ten years. Over and above, it urges states to 
initiate victim assistance programs that include mine awareness among local people. Its 
7 ICRC News Release 96/10, “Anti-personnel mines: not an indipensable weapon of high 
military value,” March 28, 1996. 
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aims officially was upheld by United Nations policy with General Assembly Resolution 
53/77. In December 1996, the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45S urged states to 
“pursue vigorously an effective,  legally binding international agreement to ban the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing 
the negotiation as soon as possible.” There were 157 states in favor, 16 abstained and no 
state was against. 
Unfortunately,  the Convention on Conventional  Weapons (CCW) agreement was 
not as comprehensive as the Mine Ban Treaty and many states were able to get away with 
the excessive use of APMs under the treaty. The compliance verification regime of CCW 
was not well-prepared. Therefore, Canada announced that it will host a meeting later in the 
year to gather all pro-ban states against APMs and to develop a common strategy towards 
the  problem.  This  meeting,  generally  referred  to  as  “the  1996  or the  first  Ottawa 
Conference”  was  held  on  3-5  October  1996.  It  initiated  what  has  been  known as  the 
“Ottawa process,” which was a fast-track negotiation about banning landmines as soon as 
possible. At the end of the meetings, Canada's Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy called 
states for another meeting before the end of 1997 with the aim of concluding the efforts 
with a ban agreement on landmines. This attempt was further supported by International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)8, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and UN Secretary-General. In December 1997, the Treaty  Signing Forum held in Ottawa 
with representatives of 121 states attending with the intention of signing the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction, or otherwise known as the Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty text was 
prepared  very similar  to  the  1992 Convention  on the  Prohibition  of  the  Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 
During the preparation phase the most important was the compliance verification 
mechanisms of the treaty. To create an effective regime, the ICRC argued that there should 
8  Main advocacy group with respect to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Campaigners work 
at local, national, regional and global levels to promote their governments to support and 
fulfill the requirements of the MBT.
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be an independent and impartial monitoring and reporting mechanism on States Parties' 
compliance  with  the  MBT.  To  further  develop  verification  strategies,  the  International 
Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures to ban Anti-Personnel Landmines (the 
Bonn Expert  Meeting)  was held on 24 and 25 April  1997.  As part  of  this  verification 
system, in 1998, the ICBL started Landmine Monitor project, a systematic annual report 
that monitors and document the use, stockpiling, destruction, production and transfer of 
APMs throughout the world. 
The Landmine Monitor  is  unique in  its  own way due to  its  civil  society based 
reporting network as it is not a formal verification mechanism. It is an initiative to hold 
governments accountable to the liabilities specified under the MBT. A coalition of over 
1,400  local,  national  or  international  NGOs  in  over  90  countries  collect  and  analyze 
information for the preparation of Landmine Monitor every year. The bulk of the report is 
comprised of in-country researches done by in-country researchers, in other words, local 
initiatives. The contributors include academics, research institutions, experts, campaigners, 
and journalists. The Monitor defines its mission as follows:
   “The Landmine Monitor complements the existing state-based reporting 
and compliance mechanisms established by the  treaty.  It represents  the 
first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and 
sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to 
regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting 
into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.”9 
The  Landmine  Monitor  is  also  intended  to  complement  the  States  Parties' 
transparency reports submitted because of Article 7 of the MBT. 10 
In conclusion, its pioneering in NGO advocacy in disarmament area and its effective 
pressure on states make the Mine Ban Treaty an ideal  case to study how transnational 
9 Landmine Monitor Report: Toward a Mine-Free World. Geneve: International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines, 2007. p. v
10 Landmine Monitor Report: Toward a Mine-Free World. Geneve: International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines, 2009. 
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advocacy networks (TANs) influence states.  Therefore,  this  thesis  takes the case of the 
MBT in order to understand why efforts of TANs fail influencing some countries. 
12
CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1. Introduction
As is in all disciplines, concepts and theories that either describe or explain political 
phenomena  are  fundamental  to  the  field  of  International  Relations  and  the  discussions 
within it. The necessity for theory and theorizing is essential for the study of global politics 
and  the  scientific  study  of  it.  Some  may  question  the  relevance  of  theory  and  the 
multiplicity of theories in the field. As Meyers, ironically puts it:
   '[why don’t we have]  one elegant, empirically rich, epistemologically 
parsimonious,  and  above  all,  understandable  theory  which  provides  an 
explanation  of  facts,  predicts  future  outcomes  from  known  boundary 
conditions with a good degree of certainty, and also allows you to define 
and choose an option for action, and to justify that choice vis-à-vis all 
those  I-told-you-so-before  pundits  and  the  it-will-never-work-that-way 
critics of this world?'11
A theory is like “a net that we throw out in the world” to catch and then to rationalize, 
explain, and dominate it.12 Because the world consists of many different social, political and 
economic realities, Meyer concludes that there must be many different nets with 'sometimes 
coarser,  sometimes finer  meshes.'13 This  means that  we need  theories to  discover  these 
distinct realities that co-exist with one another. In addition to these theories we also need 
11 Reinhard Meyers, “The Role of Theory in the Study of International Politics: Sketches 
for a Fuller Academic Biography”  http://ivv7srv15.uni-muenster.de/reinhardmeyers/docs/The
%20role%20of%20theory%20in%20IR.doc
12 Popper quoted in Meyers, Ibid, p.1
13 Ibid, p.1
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concepts, which are used to identify and/or typologize objects or phenomenon in a specific 
area of study. As Guzzini points out that “Without concepts that cut through the forest of 
empirical data, we would be unable to see the wood for the trees.”14
There is also another aspect of the role of theory that needs reminding: “no data 
speaks  for  itself”.  In  other  words,  every  empirical  study in  social  sciences  requires  a 
theoretical framework to interpret the data and analyze it. For that purpose, theory helps 
researchers  in  two  interrelated  ways.  First,  theories  explain  events,  happenings,  and 
phenomenon. It seeks to present a parsimonious and general picture of patterns of behavior. 
As Hyde-Price notes, this effort requires a certain amount of abstraction and simplification 
of the phenomenon in hand, because it does not aim to describe but to explain.15 Waltz says 
“theory is a means of dealing with complexity.” To exemplify his point, he suggests the 
concept  of  the rational  actor  in  economics,  through which16 the reduction of  people  to 
economic maximizers helps economic theory become possible. Because some factors are 
more important than others, in theories 'the world must be drastically simplified' in order to 
focus on the regularities and repetitions of behavior.17 Secondly, theory is constitutive. That 
is to say, theories also give us meaning about the world we live in and accordingly help 
orient  human action.  In  theorizing  politics  we also make sense  of  politics,  which  then 
govern and orient our action toward the objects and subjects in political life. 
In order to embed my argument in a theoretical framework, firstly I shall look at the 
International Relations theory literature. This chapter serves as a literature review that will 
introduce  several  International  Relations  theories  with  their  own  concepts  and 
understanding of international affairs. I shall give these theories’ perspectives on norms, 
norm diffusion and how they approach to the Mine Ban Treaty. Their answers are imbued 
by two characteristics of the concept of theory discussed above. To increase the explanatory 
power of the theory, some of them may overlook the gist of the Ottawa Process; still, the 
14 S. Guzzini, “The Significance and Roles of Teaching Theory in International Relations”, 
Journal of International relations and Development, 4.2, 2001, p. 99
15 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13, 2006, p. 219
16 Kenneth  Waltz,  “Realist  Thought  and  Neorealist  Theory”,  Journal  of  International 
Affairs, 1990, p. 27
17 Ibid, p.27
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main argument proposed by this thesis draws on these theoretically informed explanations. 
As it will be discussed in detail in the next section, landmines —as well as other small arms
— had been seen as an important factor that contributed to a state's military capability in 
the security studies that has been dominated by realist conceptions for decades. It is for this 
reason, weapons of any sort are the most common instruments of demonstrating a state's 
power to defend, deter or simply to attack. Realist arguments present very useful insight 
about  acquisition  of  weapons;  however,  their  constructivist  opponents  also  raise  some 
important  points  about  explaining how human rights  advocacy movements  that  lead to 
disarmament  settlements  attract  widespread  international  cooperation.  This  chapter  is 
organized under three subtitles, each of them addressing a different mainstream IR theory. 
These  are  Neorealism,  Neoliberal  Institutionalism,  and  Social  Constructivism.  After 
presenting the assumptions, and workings of the theory, I present how each theory would 
approach the Mine Ban Treaty. I then offer how each theory has unmistakable shortcomings 
in explaining the reason why International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), or the 
transnational mine-ban advocacy network, influenced some states and not others. 
3.2. Neorealism
Political realism has dominated the discipline and practice of international relations 
during the Cold War. In realist theory, the most prioritized issue for the state is to sustain its  
survival. That is to say, a state’s most prior interest is survival, and they take steps in order  
to  ensure  their  survival.  As  Grieco  neatly  summarizes,  realism  encompasses  five 
propositions.18 First, major actors in world affairs are states.  States are both the only and 
the most important international actors. Small and mid-sized states act according to the 
rules set  by major  powers.  Rivalry between states is  what  international  politics is.  The 
distribution of power in the system determines the dimensions of this rivalry. Second, states 
are “sensitive to costs” and act as unitary-rational agents.  To account for patterns of state 
behavior, realism sees states as functionally similar and their interests as set exogenously 
18 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization. 42.3 (1988): 492. 
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according  to  the  anarchic  nature  of  the  international  system.  The  concept  of  “interest 
defined as power” is primary because we cannot know the real motives of states for sure. 
Thus, the features of decision-makers are irrelevant and it is sufficient to know that they act 
in some certain way that pure interests lead. Furthermore, states strategically calculate costs 
and benefits of preferences prior to action, as they are rational agents. Third, international 
anarchy is the driving force affecting the actions of states. International system is a domain 
with no sovereign power. Fourth, states mainly act according to power and security in an 
international anarchic environment, thus generally competition and conflicts get in the way 
of cooperation even if some common interests exist between states. Because the anarchical 
nature  of  the  system enforces  the  conditions  in  which  no  international  organization  is 
capable of maintaining order, states are left on their own to provide security; hence, the 
system is a self-help system. Even if they feel confident about other states having good 
intentions, they cannot have the same confidence about their future intentions. Eventually, 
this leads to a desire to increase military capabilities, which causes militarized disputes due 
to the security dilemma.19 This desire of power maximization is what lays behind all the 
security policies of countries. However, it is not the only concern of states. States generally 
seek  relative  gains,  better  deals  than  their  competitors.  This  concern  for  relative  gains 
restricts cooperation initiatives. Because appearing as aggressive power maximizers may 
endanger their security,  rational calculations of benefits and costs help them to find the 
convenient time for power maximization. Most of the time, they wait for that opportunity 
while  trying  to  maximize  their  security  instead  of  power.20 Finally,  international 
organizations have a marginal effect on a state’s behavior. This last proposition appears to 
be directly related to political realism's position towards efforts of humanitarian concerns 
19 For fundamental texts of realist theory in International Relations See, E. H. Carr, The 
Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London  and  New  York:  Harper  Torchbooks,  1964);  Hans  J.  Morgenthau,  Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); 
Kenneth  N.  Waltz,  Man,  the  State,  and  War:  A Theoretical  Analysis  (New  York: 
Columbia  University  Press,  1959);  Waltz,  Theory of  International  Politics  (Reading, 
Mass.:   Addison-Wesley,  1979);  Grieco,  Joseph  M.  "Anarchy  and  the  Limits  of 
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.”  International  
Organization. 42.3 (1988): 425-507.
20 Snyder, G. 2002. Mearsheimer's world – offensive realism and the struggle for security. 
International Security, 27(1): 149–73 
16
and collective action on security issues. The agenda of neorealism, as being the widely 
accepted  interpretation  of  realism  today,  is  preoccupied  with  hard  power  and  “high 
politics”. The influence of non-state actors on the behavior of states is marginal.21  What we 
can talk about the influence of international institutions can only be the influence of major 
powers in the cooperation. These institutions are financially and administratively dependent 
on states, and thus they are not autonomous entities. However, this does not mean states, as 
realists theorize, do not take moral issues into account. Not every action is taken according 
to maximize their power or security. Sometimes, they strive to protect or sustain certain 
human rights norms in international relations. Nevertheless, these issues have to remain 
behind the red line of national security. Environment or international human rights issues 
can be on the agenda of states to the point that they do not collide with national interests. 
As we will see later in this study, statements of many state officials regarding the Mine Ban 
Treaty echo the same thing: they are in favor of banning the indiscriminate use of anti-
personnel mines (APMs) but they also maintain the idea of right to self defense and that the 
national security issues are closed to any compromise. 
Neorealism  is  also  wary  of  the  role  of  norms  in  international  relations.  Carr 
renounces the role of ideational factors stating that “the supposedly absolute and universal 
principles are not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based 
on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time.”22 Norms are seen as 
intervening variables, which only indicates the distribution of power in international realm. 
Though norms are standards of behavior, which can influence the strategic calculations of 
costs and benefits and constrain state preferences, this influence is miniscule. As Florini 
points out, changes in international relations, as well as change of norms, occur only when 
the distribution of power changes.23 Neorealist scholars accuse constructivist literature of 
presenting only weak cases of norm diffusion, and selectively leaving out hard cases of 
“advanced industrial  democracies  with a  history of  national  attachment  to  a  competing 
21 Keohane, R. and Nye, J. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston: Little Brown. p. 23-4
22 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of 
International  Relations,  2nd  ed.  (London:  Macmillan  Press:  Papermac,  1946,  1983 
printing), p. 87.
23 Florini, Ann. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 
(1996) 40, p. 365
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norm.”24 These cases where major states preserve their  material  interests  in the face of 
international norms is the Achilles heel of constructivist norm research. With respect to 
norm diffusion, the literature is divided into two: rationalist approach and constructivist 
approach.  The  rationalist  approach,  which  includes  the  neorealist  coercion based 
explanation  and  neoliberal  preference/interest  based  explanation,  argues  that  states 
calculate  their  costs  and  benefits  and  adopt  international  norms  accordingly.25 Be  it 
humanitarian or not, every treaty that a state commits to is carefully chosen according to a 
state's national interests. If, for example, the USA didn't sign Kyoto Protocol due to its 
economic interests in neoliberal logic, we won’t expect it to sign the Mine Ban Treaty for 
military interests in realist logic. The US decision to agree to an international agreement 
depends on whether the interest of the state is for it or against it. 
Although I have given due space to the dominant theory of international relations, 
there is little realist theorizing on the landmine issue. This being said, however, we can 
derive certain propositions of realist theory based on its assumptions, language, and logic of 
international political life. One such attempt is made by Rutherford who considers the end 
of the Cold War as a facilitator of the placement of mine ban issue on the international 
agenda. Such an argument claims that after the end of the Cold War, small and middle 
states  found  room to  pursue  foreign  policies  in  which  they  didn't  have  to  follow  the 
requisites  of  their  “big  brothers”.  Thus,  the  possibility  of  focusing  on  less  strategic 
weapons, like APMs, became visible. Rutherford maintains  “Realists could assert that the 
end of the Cold War has led to irresponsible behavior by non-major states because they no 
longer feel beholden to major powers and/or have concern for their security. They would 
argue that these states are acting foolishly and will eventually be punished for weakening 
their own security by giving up a weapon that retains a military utility on the battlefield.”26 
Concern for relative gains would have been much higher if the system was bipolar and thus 
24 Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis. “When norms clash: international norms, 
domestic practices, and Japan's internalisation of the GATT/WTO.” Review of 
International Studies. (2005) 31. p.4
25 Neoliberal rationalist and constructivist approaches are discussed under relevant 
sections. 
26 Kenneth R. Rutherford (2000). The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the 
Role of NGOS in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines. World Politics, 53 , pp 85.
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it  would have been hard for  a humanitarian disarmament treaty such as  the Mine Ban 
Treaty to surface on the international agenda. But if in fact states signed the treaty, then this 
shows that those who signed it perceived relative gains to be on their favor and those who 
didn’t sign had concerns about relative gains due to the anarchic nature of the international 
system. Major states such as USA, Russia, China, India or Pakistan didn't sign this treaty 
because of relative gains problem; none of them wanted to forgo their “legitimate” weapons 
before  other  major  powers  in  the  world  do  so.27 These  non-signatory major  states  are 
important from another aspect; many of them are the world's largest landmine producers. 
This  is  why the  commitment  not  to  sell  anti-personnel  mines  (APMs) when you don't  
produce at all proves little about the treaty's success. 
Another issue is the utility of APMs. One reason why states don't sign the treaty is 
that they see APMs as legitimate and useful means of providing protection to the borders,  
as well as to the citizens. Price argues that “this argument rightly points out that several 
states that have championed a comprehensive ban on AP land mines,  such as Belgium, 
Germany, and Canada, were not currently employing these weapons operationally and thus 
had little to lose by condoning a ban.”28
All  this  said,  however,  neorealist  perspective  cannot  completely  account  for 
transnational advocacy groups'  influence on states. It falls short on explaining why this 
issue has gained priority in international agenda in the first place. Rutherford asks, why 
landmines  drew  such  an  attention  rather  than  many  other  worthwhile  issues,  such  as 
environmental degradation and child soldiers. All these issues have had low priority for 
governments;  but  why  did  landmines  surface  among  many  other  possible  options?29 
27 Some of the official  statements of non-signatory major  states are as  follows:  China, 
“Preventing foreign military interference and aggression so as to maintain national unity 
and territorial integrity and safeguard the people's well-being”; India, “India does not 
subscribe to the treaty due to security reasons”; Pakistan, “Pakistan's peculiar security 
requirements do not permit [it] to accept a ban on the use of landmines”; Russia, “1. 
Protect nuclear plants 2. Protect borders”; United States, “1. Security situation in Korea 
2. Maintanence of mized landmine systems” These accounts are taken from Rutherford, 
Kenneth R. “The Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention: A non-hegemonic regime.” 
in “Cooperating Without America.” Stefan Brem and Kendall Stiles (eds.) New York: 
Routledge Press, 2009. 123-146.
28  Richard Price (1998). Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Land Mines. International Organization, 52 , p 614. 
29 Ibid p. 86.
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Neorealist  ontology does  not  allow much to  say about  non-state  actors.  Therefore,  the 
explanatory power of neorealism about agenda setting efforts  of NGOs, controlling the 
issue and encouraging states to sign the treaty is low.30 As discussed before, neorealism 
assumes international organizations and other non-state actors as a part of the international 
system in which power distribution determines the preferences of states as actors. Thus, an 
independent  NGO  work  in  security  domain,  which  is  exactly  what  the   International 
Campaign Banning Landmines (ICBL) is about, cannot be a part of neorealist discourse. 
However, the main reason why states paid attention to landmines was because of agenda 
setting  and issue  framing  efforts  of  local  and  international  NGOs,  and  other  non-state 
actors. 
Yet, another shortcoming of neorealist account is about the non-signatory landmine 
producer states. Though major APM producers such as US and China didn't sign the treaty, 
many producer countries stopped their manufacture and closed down their factories after 
the  norm  went  into  affect.  Furthermore,  anti-personnel  landmine  production  is  not  a 
profitable  business;  cost  of  producing APMs is  as  little  as  $3.  In  fact,  mine  clearance 
service is much more profitable than producing landmines. According to 1999 Landmine 
Monitor report: 
   [The]  number of states producing landmines has dropped dramatically 
from 54 to 16. the 38 who have stopped production include a majority of the 
big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s – those who bear much 
of the responsibility for the tens of millions of mines now in the ground. 
Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years 
have signed the treaty and stopped production: Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Czech  Republic,  France,  Hungary,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Other 
significant producers that have signed include Germany, Croatia, Chile and 
Brazil.”31
Other than reducing the number of mine producing countries, the use of APMs by major 
powers also changed after the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Powerful states that didn't sign the 
treaty themselves  constrained their  behavior and changed landmine policies.  China and 
Russia put unilateral landmine export moratorium, whereas India supported the ban on all 
landmine transfers. During armed struggle with Kurdish rebel group PKK, Turkey declared 
moratorium on production and use of APMs although it opposed to sign the treaty. United 
30 Ibid p.108.
31 Landmine Monitor Report 1999 (fn, 33), 5.
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States  also  put  unilateral  landmine export  moratorium but  also  started  new and costly 
research and development projects to find a substitute for APMs. This means that whether 
they commit to the treaty or not, these states are, at the very least, are trying to comply with 
this internationalized norm. Many states declared that the humanitarian costs override the 
military use of APMs, which seems to “introduce a moral calculus into the definition of 
national interest.”32 South Africa,  a powerful actor in the region, held a pro-ban stance 
unlike  neorealist  assumptions.  All  of  these  points  remain  as  pinholes  undermining  the 
realist account with respect to the role of norms and transnational civil society, in general, 
and the success of the Mine Ban Treaty in particular. Although high security concerns are 
very  important  in  terms  of  their  role  in  blocking  transnational  mine-ban  advocacy 
network's influence on states, neorealist perspective on its own is not well equipped to 
account for why some non-signatory states comply with the norm as much as they can, 
even having high security concerns.
3.3. Neoliberal Institutionalism
Liberalism is optimistic about a world with cooperation among international actors. 
Contrary to realism, it argues that international politics cannot be merely characterized with 
the  use  of  force  and  conflicts.33 They  argue  that  realism  is  wrong  to  discount  the 
32  Richard Price (1998). “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Land Mines.” International Organization, 52 , pp 614. 
33 Major  works  of  liberal  scholars  on  how states  can  achieve  strong  cooperation  See, 
Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate”, 
International  Security,  vol.24,  no.1,  1999,  pp.42-63.;  Barbara  Koremenos,  Charles 
Lipson, Duncan Snidal “The Rational Design of International Institutions” International  
Organization55:4, Autumn 2001, pp: 761-799; Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory 
and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in  Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The  
Contemporary Debate,  David A. Baldwin, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993);  Robert  Keohane  and  Lisa  Martin,  “The  Promise  of  Institutionalist  Theory,” 
International Security,  20:1 (1995); Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” 
International  Organization,  38:2  (1984);  Robert  Axelrod  and  Robert  O.  Keohane, 
“Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in.  Cooperation 
Under  Anarchy,  Kenneth  A.  Oye,  ed.  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1986); 
David O. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New 
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possibilities for international cooperation and the capacities of international institutions.34 
Especially  neoliberal  institutionalism  gives  more  attention  to  non-state  actors  such  as 
international  regimes,  NGOs, international  organizations,  multinational  corporations  and 
domestic actors alongside nation-states whose role in international affairs is central and 
decisive. Countries identified with liberal political systems, coupled with liberalist-oriented 
ruling class, can actually manage to cooperate and work in accordance with non-state actors 
under the influence of these organizations that constrain their behavior. Thus, international 
system does not always work according to the dictates of logic of self-help in international 
anarchy. Instead, political, economic, and social choices people in the member states make, 
that is to say choices not necessarily driven by the international system itself, can structure 
international  politics.  In  liberal  theorizing,  competing  interests  and  perspectives  are 
perpetuated  by  influences  from elites,  pressure  groups  and  other  various  parts  of  the 
society,  and  these  factors  that  constitute  the  domestic  politics  have  a  major  role  in 
determining the foreign policy of a state. In sum, “foreign policy is domestic preferences 
projected outwards.”35 
According to neorealism and neoliberalism, norms are understood as “standards of 
behavior  that  can  alter  the  calculations  of  costs  and benefits  and constrain  the  options 
available  to  policy  makers,  but  again  norms  are  exogenized.”36 The  neoliberal  view, 
however, is more optimistic about the role of norms in international relations as well as 
norms’ contribution to possible international cooperation. The neoliberalist argument about 
international institutions, also known as rational functional approach, views international 
agreements as instruments of solving mutual problems between parties. The emphasis here 
is  on needs and interests  of  states,  and the incentives that  enable states  to  come to an 
agreement when they cannot solve the problems through other means. However, according 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 
(New  York:  Basic  Books,  1984);  Axelrod  and  Robert  O.   Keohane,  "Achieving 
Cooperation Under  Anarchy:  Strategies  and Institutions," World Politics  38 (October 
1985), pp. 226-54; 
34 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization. 42.3 (1988): 492. 
35 Collins, Alan. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford University Press, 2010. p.36
36 Florini, Ann. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 
(1996) 40, 363-389. p. 365.
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to Simmons, no state wants to unilaterally take measures about an issue (in our case, this  
corresponds  to  norm-driven  agreements)  and  become  the  disadvantageous  side.37 
International  agreements help a common action to be realized and decrease uncertainty 
about future behavior of states. The diffusion and adoption of norms is actually realized due 
to cost benefit calculation by rational agents in an anarchical system. Nevertheless, the role 
of non-state actors and the norms they uphold are still secondary when compared to states 
and their interests according to neoliberal institutionalism. Above all, this logic is restricted 
in certain domains such as environmental issues or human rights; unfortunately, there is not 
much neoliberal institutionalist analysis on how non-state actors act on the security domain. 
While  neoliberal  institutionalism  gives  considerable  attention  to  international 
regimes, it does not provide a theoretical explanation especially for the effectiveness of 
security regimes. International regimes are seen as effective only in issues of low politics 
such as society, environment or economics.38 Hathaway argues that states do not commit to 
treaties prior to taking positive and negative effects into account.39 For a neoliberalist, this 
can be the underlying reason why Turkey signed the Mine Ban Treaty. One may argue for 
the Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy in which Turkey’s desire to join the EU and 
implement its acquis, also spilled over to other areas of its foreign policy.40 Onis states 
“Potential  European  Union  (EU)  membership  creates  both  conditions  and  incentives, 
constituting  a  powerful  engine  of  democratization  and  economic  transformation  in 
candidate countries in the process.”41 Correspondingly, negotiations, which started in 1999 
between  Turkey  and  European  Union  about  a  prospective  membership,  may  be  that 
37 Simmons, Beth A. “Compliance with International Agreements.” Annual Review of 
Political Science (1998) 1.1, 75-93.
38 Robert O. Keohane,  After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political  
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 49-109; Stephen D. Krasner, 
“Sovereign Regimes, and Human Rights,” in Volker Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and 
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1993)
39 Hathaway, Oona A. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. (2007) 51. p. 590.
40 Onis,  Ziya.  “Domestic  Politics,  International  Norms  and  Challenges  to  the  State: 
Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era.” Turkish Studies Vol. 4, Iss. 1, 2003. 9-
34.
41 Ibid.
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underlying cause that brought about the conditions for Turkey to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. 
This was also possible partially due to the international political environment after Cold 
War.  O'Dwyer argues that it  became harder for major powers such as China or United 
States to coerce other states to support them especially after the end of the Cold War.42 In 
the absence of major power pressure, states found room to decide on implementing treaties 
more freely based on their own cost-benefit calculations. 
There are, however, shortcomings of the neoliberal institutionalist approach which 
does not explain the reason how transnational advocacy networks brought about change in 
the security domain. Also, Price argues that “The shortcoming of this approach is that it 
treats interests as exogenous and privileges the state as the key site of agency, whereas in 
the  case  at  hand [the  Mine Ban Treaty]  the  key impetus  for  normative  change lies  in 
processes  engendered  by  transnational  and  non-state  sources  of  agency  that  generate 
interests.”43 
3.4. Social Constructivism 
The primary things that social constructivism in IR is dealing with is the constitutive 
role of norms and shared understandings among states, as well as the relationship between 
agency and structure.44 Along material relations, interaction, historicity and identities play 
42 O'Dwyer, Diana. (2006) “First landmines, now small arms?: The International campaign 
to ban landmines as a model for small-arms advocacy.” Irish Studies in International 
Affairs. 17. p. 77-97
43 Richard Price (1998). Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Land Mines. International Organization, 52 , pp 614.
44  For major works of constructivist  scholars See,  Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what 
states make of it:  Social  Construction of  Power Politics”,  International  Organization,  
vol.46,  no.2,  1992,  pp.391-425;   Ted  Hopf,  “The  Promise  of  Constructivism  in 
International  Relations  Theory”  International  Security  1998,  23:1,  pp:  171-200; 
Alexander  Wendt,  “Driving  with  the  Rearview  Mirror:  On  the  Rational  Science  of 
Institutional Design”  International Organization  55, 4, Autumn 2001, pp: 1019-1049.; 
John Meyer,  “The Changing  Cultural  Content  of  the  Nation-State:  A World  Society 
Perspective,” in New Approaches to the State in the Social Sciences, George Steinmetz,  
ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997);   Jef Huymans,  The Politics of Insecurity,  
Fear,  Migration  and  Asylum  in  the  EU,  London,  Routledge,  2006;  Jef  Huymans, 
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major  roles in foreign policy-making and state  preferences.  A constructivist  perspective 
does not necessarily ask a why-question, such as “Why did states sign a certain treaty”; 
instead, constructivism asks, “How is it possible for some states to cooperate on such a 
normative issue in the face of their security concerns.”  For constructivists, in addition to 
power, identities and norms influence how security interests are defined. States conform to 
norms not for utility maximization as assumed by rational choice approaches, but because 
they understand it to be appropriate and good within the ‘logic of appropriateness’. The 
actors’ interests are redefined with intensive interaction and shaped according to the ‘logic 
of appropriateness’. According to a constructivist perspective security and threats are not 
objective  and  fixed  but  they  are  socially  constructed.  States  may  change  their  threat 
perceptions by evolutions in their environment and modified practices. According to Onuf, 
international politics, far from an objective reality, is a world of our making.45 Thus, we 
have to denaturalize what has been given to us and investigate it thoroughly to see how 
some certain conditions allowed it to be as such. Fierke argues that 
   “It is not that actors are totally free to choose their circumstances, but rather 
they make choices in the process of interacting with others, and, as a result, 
bring historically,  culturally,  and politically distinct 'realities'  into being. In 
this respect, international relations is a social construction rather than existing 
independently of human meaning and action.”46 
According  to  constructivist  scholarship,  ideas  are  central  to  understand  this  social 
construction. Tannenwald identifies ideas as ideologies, normative beliefs, causal beliefs 
and policy prescriptions.47 According to her, normative beliefs set the criteria to distinguish 
“Defining  Social  Constructivism  in  Security  Studies:  The  Normative  Dilemma  of 
Writing  Security”,  Alternatives,  Special  Issue,  Vol.  27,  2002,  p.  41-62;  Audie Klotz, 
“Norms Reconstructing Interests: Global Racial Equality and US Sanctions Against South 
Africa”,  International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1995, p. 451-78; Newman, Edward. 
“Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies Perspectives 2 (2001): 239-
251.
45 Onuf, Nicholas G. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and  
International Relations. Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.
46 Fierke, K. M. “Constructivism”. In Dunne, Timothy, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. p. 180
47 Tannenwald, Nina. “Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Research Agenda,” in Nina 
Tannenwald and William C. Wohlforth, eds., “The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold 
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what is a right and wrong, or just and unjust action. One example is the  role of human 
rights norms at the end of the Cold War.48 
Wendt's constructivist theorizing was mostly on the system level and was interested 
in relations between states. In the constructivist genre Finnemore’s  National Interests in  
International  Society  was  a  milestone  for  constructivist  scholarship  on  foreign  policy 
analysis. In this book she revealed the processes in which identities and interests of states 
change. The role of norms in this process is essential. Norms in the international society 
determines  identities  and interests,  and ultimately the state  behavior.  How these norms 
affect state behavior changes from one case to another. But for constructivists, norms are 
central to international relations. Norms can be sufficient on their own in some situations to 
explain a certain action. On the other hand, both norms and rationality can alter behavior, 
too. This does not mean that the action is overdetermined. As Nyhamar notes, states may 
want to fit the social norms, yet also act based on their self-interest; thus, “norms work 
together with rationality in determining action.”49 Even in this case, power maximization 
alone is inadequate to explain state behavior. This is not because power maximization does 
not matter. Rather, it still depends on ideas.50 As Florini points out, norms changed over 
time in a way that did not reflect the distribution of power in the world.51 International 
organizations  by  which  the  norms  are  transmitted  to  states  help  creating  a  sense  of 
obligation about complying the norms, which in some cases supersedes the cost-benefit 
calculation. 
For  the  Mine  Ban Treaty  case,  a  constructivist  perspective  can  account  for  an 
explanation such as states adopt international norms and values that were created by human 
War,” Special Issue of The  Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 
13-42. 
48 Ibid, p.15
49 Nyhamar, Tore. “How Do Norms Work? A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of 
African International Relations” The International Journal of Peace Studies. 5.2 (2000).
50 Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. “Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Skeptical 
View”, in “Handbook of International Relations” edited by  Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse and Beth A. Simmons. Sage Publications, 2002, Chapter 3.
51 Florini, Ann. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 
(1996) 40, 363-389. p. 366
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meaning  and  action  to  their  foreign  policies  and  shape  their  identities  accordingly. 
Constructivist arguments have the upper hand in landmine issue since they can account for 
generally  why  security  regimes  take  place  and  specifically  why the  Mine  Ban  Treaty 
attracted  so  much  attention  from  international  society.  Rutherford  argues  “norms  are 
socially constructed and therefore allow for an NGO role in educating and pressuring other 
international actors and in establishing the landmine-ban issue on international political 
agenda.”52 Because  security  and  threats  are  not  objective  and  fixed  but  rather  socially 
constructed, constructivists emphasize the socialization between subjects and how initiated 
norms are placed on the international agenda by issue framing power of non-state actors, 
especially international NGOs. According to Keck and Sikkink, NGOs are able to diffuse 
norms. Thus, we can say NGOs delegitimated the use of anti-personnel mines in the Mine 
Ban Treaty case. Rutherford refutes the realist arguments claiming that 
   “a realist  explanation  for  the  placement  of  the landmine issue  on the 
international agenda could be the end of Cold War. Its end has enabled state 
policymakers to  focus on less strategic weapons,  such as landmines,  and 
allowed  many states  to  pursue  unilateral  military  policies,  sometimes  in 
opposition to the major powers. (...) While it is true that the end of the Cold 
War allows governments to focus on less strategic issues, and humanitarian 
NGOs to operate in previously closed areas, that fact does not provide a 
complete explanation for the rise of landmines on the international political 
agenda.”53
These NGOs that support human rights are relatively a new concept that started firstly to 
appear after the Second World War. As a matter of fact, it was only after the Cold War for 
all states to accept the idea of human rights with the universalization of the human rights 
norm. Though the number of NGOs grew impressively after the Second World War, the rise 
of NGOs actually took place in the beginning of 1980s. According to Keck and Sikkink, 
number of NGOs in the world doubled especially between 1983 and 1993.54 Methods of 
NGOs of attracting state attention also shows that non-state actors do have the ability to 
dramatically affect the foreign policy preferences of states. Adachi argues that it was all 
52 Kenneth R. Rutherford (2000). The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the 
Role of NGOS in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines. World Politics, 53.
53 Ibid, p. 86
54 Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics, Cornell U. Press, Ithaca, NY. p.90
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NGO effort that made the Japanese government to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. He maintains 
that “Via action by these NGOs and the mass media, as well as growing support from the 
international community, the voices calling for the abolition of anti-personnel mines spread 
through the political process. (...) It can be safely said that the Japanese government was 
forced to abandon its landmine policy under pressure from NGOs and prevailing public 
opinion.”55 
Nevertheless, there are still some states that have not acceded to the treaty, and these 
constructivist arguments bring to mind whether USA, Israel or South Korea lack pressures 
either from the transnational landmine-ban advocacy network or international society. On 
the other hand, constructivist arguments focus on the fact about the absence of major power 
support  to  the  treaty  whereas  many  medium  and  small  states  signed  it.  This  is  true; 
however, the number of non-signatory small/medium states is more than major powers. 
Therefore,  there should be a common reason for all types of non-signatory states share 
whether they are small or major powers. It is clear that norms matter in the landmine case. 
Conversely, there appear some points in time in which pressure of ICBL is insufficient in 
making states adopt international norms about landmines. Constructivism lacks sufficient 
theoretical  explanation to  account  for  why many states  abstain in  the face of so much 
international pressure. 
3.5. Conclusion
Liberal accounts give the most weight to interest-driven motives, whereas neorealist 
view sees states as major players and suggest coercion/enforcement explanation done by 
other states for the initiation of norm diffusion process. According to Evangelista, however, 
study about transnational actors requires a rejection of two assumptions outright: state as 
being the unitary actor and essential role of international system to shape states' behavior.56 
55  Adachi, Kenki. “Why Japan Signed the Mine Ban Treaty: The Political Dynamics 
behind the Decision” Asian Survey. 45.3 (2005), pp. 397-413
56 Matthew  Evangelista,  “The  Paradox  of  State  Strength:  Transnational  Relations, 
Domestic Structure, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union”, International 
Organization. 49.1. (1995). pp. 1-38.
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Last but not least, social constructivists add the role of transnational advocacy networks 
(TANs), especially those working in the human rights and environmental issue-areas, to the 
already heated debate.57 The latter approach falls short of explaining where the Mine Ban 
Treaty fails, too; because some states have gone much farther in adopting the norm whilst 
others drop behind, yet there are only few explanations to explain this unequal socialization 
among states.58 Structural accounts do not seem to yield satisfactory answers towards the 
issue in hand; as a result, this thesis focuses on domestic politics to explain variation in 
response  to  the  ICBL's  pressure.59 This  kind  of  approach  requires  a  bridge  between 
rationalist and constructivist accounts. In their seminal work for norm research, Finnemore 
and Sikkink argues that debates about norms do not have to be divided into tidy camps and 
researchers may marry two different approaches if necessary as many researchers in the 
field do so.60 Thereby, a bridge between ideational factors and rational choice is involved in 
the domestic politics approach. In the next chapter, I develop this approach in detail with 
regard to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) case. 
57 According to Keck and Sikkink Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) emerge when 
domestic  groups  cannot  resolve  problems  by  appealing  to  state  authorities;  when 
political  entrpreneurs  believe  that  networking  will  aid  their  cause;  and  when 
international  contacts  (e.g.  Conferences)  create  opportunities.;  Thomas  Risse  and 
Kathryn Sikkink. “The socializations of international human rights norms into domestic 
practices:  introduction”  in  The  Power  of  Human  Rights.  Edited  by  Thomas  risse, 
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 4. 
58 Thomas  Risse-Kappen's  article  studies  a  similar  research  question  but  with  other 
explanatory variables is an important example of such attempts. He asks that, “How is it 
to be explained, for example, that the spread of democratic values and human rights 
toward the end of this century, promoted by various INGOs and transnational alliances, 
has affected some countries more than others – the former Soviet Union as compared to 
China, former Czechoslovakia as compared to Romania, and South Korea as compared 
to North Korea?” Risse-Kappen, Thomas.  Bringing Transnational Relations Back in:  
Non-state  Actors,  Domestic  Structures  and  International  Institutions.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge university press, 1995.  p. 4
59 Andrew  P.  Cortell  and  James  W.  Davis.  “When  norms  clash:  International  Norms, 
Domestic  Practices,  and  Japan's  Internalization  of  the  GATT/WTO”.  Review  of 
International Studies. 31 (2005): 3-25
60 Finnemore  and  Sikkink.  “International  Norm  Dynamics  and  Political  Change.” 
International Organization. 52 (1998): 887-917.
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CHAPTER 4
 A DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACH TO THE MINE BAN TREATY
This thesis employs the methodology of case study and process-tracing, seeking to 
establish causal links between domestic factors and government responses to the Mine Ban 
Treaty  by  examining  military  crises  and  domestic  impact  of  mine-ban  norm  within 
countries. These two explanatory variables proposed to explain how and when transnational 
advocacy networks (TANs) cannot penetrate into domestic politics to shape the decisions of 
countries.61 Therefore the research question of this thesis is, “Why transnational advocacy 
networks  sometimes  fail  to  influence  state  behavior  towards  humanitarian  small  arms 
control and disarmament treaties?” There can be many reasons that may have helped TANs 
to influence governments.  However,  this  thesis  proposes that  those reasons will  not  be 
effective unless crisis level and domestic impact level of the mine-ban norm that block and 
undermine international influence are eliminated.  
Low cost and ease of use of anti-personnel mines (APMs) make them an important 
option to maintain during wartime, especially for poor countries. Basic function of APMs is 
that they serve a defensive purpose. Though there are studies, such as Red Cross's 1996 
research,  that are skeptical about how much strategic advantage mines give their  users, 
states still consider them for their military utility both during intrastate and interstate armed 
conflicts  for  self-defense.  APMs  are  effective  means  of  controlling  large  territorial 
boundaries from crossing. Some scholars argue, “whilst armies still depend on conventional 
61 Risse Kappen's book has a similar research question in here but it does so with other 
explanatory variables. He asks “Under what domestic and international circumstances do 
transnational coalitions and actors who attempt to change policy outcomes in a specific 
issue-area succeed or fail  to achieve their  goals?”  In this  thesis,  however,  only the 
domestic  circumstances  are  under  study.;  Risse-Kappen,  Thomas.  Bringing 
Transnational  Relations  Back  in:  Non-state  Actors,  Domestic  Structures  and  
International Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1995. 
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weapons and movement – moving tanks and large infantry groups – and borders are weak, 
the  defensive  tactic  of  landmines  is  highly  appropriate:  it  is  cheap,  affordable,  and 
maintains borders. Their existence can slow or stop an advance by breaking up an attack 
and forcing attackers to go certain routes, delaying or even halting conflict; they can deter 
invasion in the first place. By guarding wide areas from swift armed advance on civilians, 
they can prevent genocide.”62 
Another debated use of APMs is that they are also effective to protect peacekeeping 
forces.  Military  facilities  of  international  peacekeepers  in  places  of  civil  war  protect 
themselves  from  belligerent  armed  groups  with  laying  mines  around  strategic  units. 
Furthermore,  APMs are convenient  both for  rebels  and government forces  due to  their 
inexpensiveness and simple manufacture. Following from these reasons, this thesis suggests 
that if there is military threat that endangers the survival of the state or its troops abroad, 
then it is more likely that the mine-ban norm will run the risk of being ignored. Hawkins 
also adopts the crisis situations as an independent variable to explain state behavior against 
basic human rights. He states that “crises can easily end reformist experiments and produce 
increases in human rights abuses.”63 An analogy of a person who writes very quickly may 
illustrate this situation. If we have to write very quickly, or in other words in panic, then our 
handwriting won't be as good as it was written in any other time. Same thing goes with the 
states; when states have to act rapidly in times of crisis, they “write very badly”, so to 
speak.  Crisis  situations  embodied  in  militarized  conflict  override  demands  to  approach 
landmine issue humanistically; thus, impede the translation of international humanitarian 
norms  (in  this  case  the  norm  against  APMs)  to  domestic  policy. Therefore,  the  first 
hypothesis of this thesis about the case of the Mine Ban Treaty is that countries with high 
crisis  situation are  less  likely to  be  influenced by the  transnational  mine-ban advocacy 
network (ICBL) about implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.
On the other hand, some states have laws that regulate the use of small arms and 
weapons. Such countries can be seen as places in which the norm's tenets are embedded in 
62 Marin,  Albert  and  Litzelman,  Michael,  ‘Peacemakers  Along  the  DMZ:  Non-Self 
Destruct Landmines in the Republic of Korea’, Journal of Mine Action, Issue 6.1, April 
2002. 
63 Hawkins, Darren. "The Domestic Impact of International Human Rights Norms."Web. 9 
Jan. 2012. <http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/archive/hawkins.html>. 
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the legal texts; thus, they are expected to be more open to adopt other similar norms. In the  
same  way,  if  countries  have  organized  societal  groupings  that  work  for  the  state's 
compliance with the norm, then this domestic pressure are more likely to bear fruit when it 
is coupled with international pressure of TANs. Their joint efforts to create a room in the 
domestic discourse in favor of the norm are more effective than a mere strong international 
pressure or sanctions. These civil society groups are essential for norm compliance, or in 
other words norm internalization, especially about the issues discussed in security domain. 
These  groups,  even  though  they are  small,  sometimes  have  more  flexibility  than  their 
international  allies  to  get  their  hands  on  information.  This  is  why  the  largest  part  of 
Landmine Monitor relies on the information coming from in-country researchers, which are 
local initiatives. Local civil agents reach the needed information easier due to the fact that 
more resources are open to them; on the other hand, international pressure groups generally 
rely on the information that the government provides.64 Unwelcome practices (e.g. use of 
inhumane weapons or inconsistency of numbers in reports) in security domain particularly 
needs to be monitored by local civil society agents due to the covert nature of the security 
decision-making process. Violated norms can be best discovered by the efforts of both local 
and international advocacy groups. Furthermore, it is not just catching on violation of the 
norm. As in the case of Turkey, however, sometimes government officials are unwilling to 
reveal information about current status of weapons. At that point, the civil society plays an 
essential role to remind the government about their obligations, sometimes through voicing 
their demands with the help of a member of parliament, other times directly getting in touch 
with the relevant ministry. TANs are better off with a local civil 'ally', even moderate sized, 
to  influence  government  policies.  Hence,  in  this  thesis,  domestic  NGOs are  taken into 
account  as  local  allies with  respect  to  their  role  in  the  advocacy  network  and  their 
relationship with the international campaign. Furthermore, in countries where civil liberties, 
such as freedom of opinion or freedom of assembly, are tolerated, the political environment 
assumed to be more open for social groupings to pressure their governments to sign the 
Mine Ban Treaty. All of these factors constitute the domestic salience of the norm against  
64 This  logic  is  represented  by the  transparency reports  required  from states  under  the 
Article 7 of the MBT. ICBL established Landmine Monitor project to complement the 
information taken solely from governments with the information that the civil society 
provides. 
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APMs. As a result, domestic salience can enable states to have positive attitude towards the 
Mine Ban Treaty and therefore, they may be more open to sign it.
Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the domestic structure of the state understood in 
terms  of  state-societal  relations  is  another  factor  that  enables  TANs  to  influence  state 
behavior. Whether a country has a liberal or a state-above-society domestic structure shapes 
the  strategies  of  TANs  to  promote  norms.  This  ultimately  affects  how  norms  are 
empowered in the domestic scene and helps us to understand how norms gain salience in 
countries where civil society is not strong as in liberal polities. Both domestic salience and 
domestic  structure  concepts  inform us  about  the  impact  of  the  norm under  study in  a 
country. For this reason, an analysis of these concepts through case studies will reveal if 
and how domestic impact of mine-ban norm has a role in state decisions to sign the Mine 
Ban Treaty.  Therefore,  the  second  hypothesis  of  this  thesis  is  that  countries  with  high 
domestic impact of the norm against APMs specifically and disarmament norms in general 
are more likely to be influenced by the transnational mine-ban advocacy network (ICBL) 
about implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. 
A positive change in the outcome is expected when low level of crisis and high 
domestic impact are existent. Low level of crisis and high domestic impact are assumed to 
be both necessary conditions to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. 
4.1. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of the study is a dichotomous one, that is to say whether or 
not the state under study signed and also ratified it. According to Article 16, the Mine Ban 
Treaty  is  subject  to  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval  of  the signatories.  Ratification, 
however, shows a full commitment and determination to take responsibility of the treaty's 
requirements. Thus, wherever signing is mentioned throughout the thesis, it is also meant to 
be a ratification by the country. 
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4.2. Independent Variables
4.2.1 Domestic Impact Variable
The domestic  impact  of  disarmament norms is  expected to have some variation 
across countries. This variation in domestic impact occurs due to a combination of two 
factors: “the domestic salience of the international rule or norm; and the domestic structure 
that prevails during a given policy debate.”65 Therefore, in order to understand the domestic 
impact of the norm against APMs, a careful investigation of the domestic structure affecting 
the policy debate and the domestic salience of the norm should be done.66 The domestic 
impact of the norm is high when domestic salience is high and domestic structure is open 
enough to allow for  societal  pressure on policy making.  It  is  moderate when domestic 
salience is also moderate and domestic structure allows societal pressure on policy making. 
Lastly, low impact of the mine-ban norm indicates low domestic salience and a domestic 
structure in which relations between state and society are distant  to  the extent  that  the 
latter's influence policy making.
4.2.1.1 Domestic salience
Domestic  salience is  the measurement of the norm's strength or  legitimacy.67 As 
argued in the literature, domestic salience is a function of three factors. These are legal 
internalization,  social  internalization  and  political  internalization  of  norms.  Legal 
65 Andrew P. Cortell and James. W. Davis. “ How do International Institutions Matter?: 
The  Domestic  Impact  of  International  Rules  and  Norms.”  International  Studies 
Quarterly. 40.4 (1996): 454
66 Ibid, p. 457
67 About the importance of domestic salience to a state's compliance with international 
norms See, Legor “Which Norms Matter?”; Andrew P. Cortell and James. W. Davis. 
“How do International Institutions Matter?: The Domestic Impact of International Rules 
and Norms.” International Studies Quarterly. 40.4 (1996): 454
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internalization,  also  known  as  the  institutionalization  of  the  norm,  refers  to  norms' 
incorporation or embodiment in domestic laws. If the country's constitutional or judicial 
systems have measures in accordance with the norm, then it  is argued that the norm is 
legally internalized. According to Cortell and Davis, “when institutionalized in domestic 
legal  and  constitutional  structures,  international  rules  can  be  appropriated  by domestic 
actors  for  purposes  that  can have reverberations  in  either  the  domestic  or  international 
sphere: to press the actor's own interests against those of other national-level actors; or to 
set in motion the power of the state to further the actor's interests against those of other 
state or transnational actors.”68 As for the Mine Ban Treaty, legal internalization will be 
studied by examining domestic laws and regulations of countries. Less conflict between 
domestic institutions implies more domestic salience for the norm against APMs. Besides, 
commitment  to  other  disarmament  treaties  also  reveals  information  about  legal 
internalization of disarmament norms in general. Commitment or support for Treaties or 
UN resolutions  such  as  Convention  on Conventional  Weapons  (CCW),  Convention  on 
Cluster  Munitions,  UNGA Resolutions  in  support  of  the  total  ban  of  APMs,  Chemical 
Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and 2006 UNGA Resolution 61/89 
about a possible arms trade treaty can be good indicator in this case. 
Social  internalization  stands  for  the  appearance  of  the  norm  in  the  domestic 
discourse with efforts  of civil  society.  These efforts  aim to pressure decision-makers to 
change domestic policy in favor of the norm. Moravcsik argues that civil society can take 
advantage  of  the  pressure  of  TANs  on  governments  from  within.69 This  idea  is  also 
supported by other scholars, such as Risse, Ropp and Sikkink who claim “The diffusion of 
international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the establishment and the 
sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who manage to link up 
with international regimes, to alert Western public opinion and Western governments.”70 
68 Andrew P. Cortell and James. W. Davis. “ How do International Institutions Matter?: 
The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms.” International Studies 
Quarterly. 40.4 (1996): 454
69 As cited in Darren H. Hawkins. “Domestic Responses to International Pressure.”
 European Journal of International Relations 3.4 (1997): 406
70 Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. The Power of Human Rights:  
International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. pg. 5
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This is especially important for the landmine case because by itself international pressure 
groups will lack the resources to influence governments about an issue related with national 
security. Particularly about small arms disarmament, domestic pressure groups have more 
resources  to  get  information  concerning  the  operation  of  policies  with  regard  to 
disarmament and the situation of current weapons. Because of this, this thesis also argues 
that  TANs  especially  need  to  ally  with  domestic  societal  actors  in  the  course  of  the 
promotion of small arms disarmament norms. 
Social internalization can also be distinguished when societal  or influential  state 
actors address the norm's tenets in domestic policy debates.71 This kind of internalization is 
the most important among the three, which also include legal and political internalization, 
in terms of its contribution to the domestic salience of the norm. For this reason, street 
demonstrations, petitions or national campaigns specifically in favor of  banning  APMs or 
in general about disarmament will be checked for each case. Third factor, namely political 
internalization, is displayed through state policies. 
Taking all these factors into account enables us to create a three value scale of norm 
salience: high, moderate and limited. High salience is existent in contexts in which the three 
factors  mentioned  above  are  present.  Salience  is  moderate  when  political  and  legal 
internalization  are  completed  but  there  is  still  reservations  by  elites  against  the  norm. 
Lastly, salience is limited when “the norm remains nominally on the political agenda.”72 
4.2.1.2 Domestic structure
The notion of domestic structures is an important component of how norms gain 
domestic impact in a country. It's a necessary concept to understand “the normative and 
organizational arrangements which form the 'state', structure society, and link the two in the 
polity.”73 Established state-society relations gives an idea to transnational actors about how 
71 Ibid.
72 Andrew  P.  Cortell  and  James  W.  Davis.  “When  norms  clash:  International  Norms, 
Domestic  Practices,  and  Japan's  Internalization  of  the  GATT/WTO”.  Review  of 
International Studies. 31 (2005): 9
73 Risse-Kappen, Thomas.  Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state Actors,  
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to access the domestic discourse and promote norms. The ultimate success -policy impact-, 
however, does not come with easy access, but with TANs' ability to adjust their  policy 
strategies to the domestic structure and build “winning coalitions” in the country.74 Some 
domestic structures have low level of freedom and allow very small room for individuals to 
organize and communicate with each other. Keck and Sikkink argues that, a very powerful 
state, which controls every move of domestic civil society, complicates the emergence of 
TANs.75
Checkel proposes four domestic structure categories: liberal, corporatist, statist and 
state-above-society.76 Certain domestic structures facilitate TANs' efforts, yet some of them, 
such as statist or state-above society structures, make their task more difficult. USA, one of 
the selected cases for this thesis, has a liberal domestic structure making access easier but 
complicate  the process of policy impact,  simply because building winning coalitions  is 
harder  for  TANs when  many and  divergent  individuals  and  groups  in  society  actively 
participate to influence government decisions. These domestic actors have a pivotal role in 
policy-making, and their pressure on elites helps international norms to empower and gain 
salience  in  domestic  discourse.  State-above-society  structure,  that  the  case  of  Cuba 
embodies, is the opposite of liberal structure. The state has extensive control over social 
groups in society. For this model, Checkel argues that “in this 'top-down' policy-making 
environment,  elite  learning  is  necessary  if  international  norms  are  to  be  empowered 
domestically;  as  learning theory suggests,  it  is  also more  likely in  this  less  politicized 
setting.”77 Lastly, Turkey case is an example for statist structure. Elite learning is primary 
whereas  societal  pressure  on  elites  is  secondary  for  norm  empowerment  in  this  type. 
Domestic  Structures  and International  Institutions.  Cambridge:  Cambridge university 
press, 1995. pg. 6
74 Ibid, pg. 26
75 Keck , Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in  
International Politics, Cornell University Press, 1998. p. 206-208.
76 Many  scholars  come  up  with  different  categories  of  domestic  structures  defined 
differently.  Cortell  and  Davis  (1996)  look  at  pattern  of  state-societal  relations  and 
structure of decision-making authority.  In this  thesis, Checkel's  categories (1997) are 
employed for their more generalizable nature. 
77 Jeffrey  Checkel,  “International  Norms  and  Domestic  Politics:  Bridging  Rationalist-
Constructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997): 473-495
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Though elite learning has a more dominant role and state-society relationship is weaker 
than in  liberal  structures,  if  lobbies  or civil  society organizations  have opportunities  to 
influence them on their own or in alliance with the transnational advocacy network, then 
global norms are likely to achieve domestic impact in the country. 
4.2.2. Level of Crisis variable
It  is  argued that  state  officials  refuse to adopt  human rights norms during crisis 
situations believing that it would show weakness on their side and diminish state power.78 
Furthermore, small arms and weapons may prove to have military utility in armed conflicts 
although they have humanitarian costs. Because of these reasons, it is expected that states 
would abstain banning the use of  small  arms,  in  this  case APMs, especially during an 
ongoing militarized conflict. 
The indicator of crisis level is mainly security agenda of countries at the time of 
signing the MBT. Existence of violence, political instability, militarized ethnic problems, 
account of recent military experience can explain the crisis level of a country. For USA, 
however, we should also consider the deployment of American troops in other countries 
that have been sent to protect USA's extraterritorial interests. After a careful study of these 
different indicators of crisis level variable, every country case will be assigned a value for 
the variable:  high or low.  Statements  of the government that point to a military threat, 
ceasefires or absence of armed struggle will be taken into account as indicators of low level 
of crisis. For every country case, it is also important to look at where APMs are used and 
whether there is any change in area of usage. In other words, a survey on qualitative change 
of crisis situation will be done.
78 Steven C. Poe, C. Neal tate and Linda Camp Keith, “Repression  of the Human Right to 
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1076-
1993,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 291-313; Christian Davenport, “State 
Repression and Political Order,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10 (2003): 1-23
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4.3. Case Selection and Research Methods
According  to  Onderco,  “The  puzzle  determines  the  method,  not  vice  versa.”79 
Because of the qualitative nature of the domestic impact variable, this thesis uses process-
tracing alongside comparative method while both benefiting from within-case and across-
case  analysis.  Collier  argues  that,  “Process-tracing  is  a  fundamental  tool  of  qualitative 
analysis.  This  method is  often  invoked by scholars  who carry out  within-case  analysis 
based on qualitative data.”80  Another method in this thesis, case studies, were existent since 
the beginning of modern social science. After the Second World War, however, quantitative 
methodologies came into prominence and more or less dominated the field. Qualitative case 
study approach never gained too much popularity among methodologists; but, even in the 
time when quantitative methods were much favorable,  many of the major works in the 
literature  were  of  case  study  researchers.  Interpretivist  and  post-positivist  approaches 
mainly  use  this  method  because  it  is  better  equipped  to  analyze  discourses,  ideas  or 
perceptions. Therefore, details and causal links that need attention in discourses, ideas and 
perceptions would be more properly investigated with case study method rather than with 
large-N study. 
Comparison is a very basic skill in social sciences research. Even a single case study 
includes comparison. A researcher can compare individuals, groups, governments, states, 
ideas or different time points in history. The main aim of comparing is to come up with 
similarities or differences between cases. The effort to find out similarities between cases is 
to reach generality that helps to build a theory that can explain many cases. 
In this thesis, there are three cases which are Cuba, Turkey and USA. Cases are 
selected according to their variations in independent variables. This also helps us to see 
variance in domestic impact and level of crisis variables within each country as well as 
across  different  countries.  This  variation  in  within-case  study  and  cross-case  study 
increases the number of observations available to scholars searching for an understanding 
of  the  conditions  in  which  norms  and  networks  matter.  Within-case  analysis  is  also 
79  Onderco, Michal. “Reality of Norms and Reality,”  Amsterdam Law Forum, p. 149.
80 David Collier, “Understanding Process-Tracing,” Political Science and Politics 44.4 
(2011): 823-30.
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important to identify a causal process. Authors of  Rethinking Social Inquiry argue that, 
“within-case analysis privileges evidence about causal mechanisms, pushing researchers to 
ask whether change in the independent variables in fact preceded change in the dependent 
variable  and,  more  significantly,  by  what  process  change  in  the  dependent  variables 
produced the outcome.”81 According to Geddes, selection of cases based on geographical 
location leads to selection on the dependent variable.82 Therefore, the cases in this study are 
especially chosen from different geographical locations in order to prevent geographical 
effects. Other criterion was to select them according to their power status and domestic 
structure.  Power  status  of  the  state  is  directly  related  with  the  security  concerns  and 
economic resources of a country. Therefore, it can affect how much states are influenced by 
TANs to influence government decisions about the MBT. There is no standard definition for 
each of the power status categories.  Some researchers rank countries according to their 
gross national income (GNI) and in accordance with this definition, middle powers are the 
ones  which  have  not  a  big  economy but  not  a  small  economy either.  This  approach, 
however,  may  misdirect  about  the  actual  power  a  state  possess  because  economic 
development is not always a defining factor. Economically speaking, China is considered to 
be a upper middle income country by the World Bank. In terms of influence in international 
affairs, on the other hand, China is certainly a major power, if not a superpower, given its 
permanent  membership  in  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  (UNSC),  economic 
relations with other countries, its ability to exert influence regionally or globally and  its 
military strength.  Therefore,  economic and military strength,  permanent  membership  in 
UNSC and substantial amount of influence over global and regional issues can indicate if a  
country is a major player in world affairs. The Unites States, being the most powerful actor 
in  the  world  today,  was  considered  to  be  a  great  power  in  this  study.  Similarly,  in 
accordance with how they fit to the criteria above, Turkey and Cuba was considered to be 
middle and small powers respectively. 
81 Brady, Henry E. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. p. 112.
82 Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection 
Bias in Comparative Politics," Political Analysis 2 (1990), 131-50. p. 138
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Countries
Domestic Structure Power Status
Cuba State-above-society Small
Turkey Statist Middle
USA Liberal Great
Table 1. Classification of cases according to structure and power status
Another classification was made according to the domestic structure of states. Type 
of domestic structure directly influences how TANs are able to affect policy change in 
countries.  Hence,  they are  useful  categories  in  case  they may reveal  a  complementary 
information.  
In addition to process-tracing and comparative case methods, a standardized, open-
ended interview will be conducted with the coordinator of the Initiative for a Mine-Free 
Turkey (IMFT) for the case of Turkey.83 Interviews are a good way of getting an in-depth 
information about the experience of an insider to understand the process under study.84 This 
is especially useful when there are not much source of information on the subject matter. In 
the case of Mine Ban Treaty, the primary source is the Landmine Monitor reports which are 
compiled of official and NGO sourced information. Therefore, the aim of this interview is 
to  provide more information about  landmine issue in  Turkey and to extend the use of 
qualitative research methods employed in the thesis. A total of nine questions categorized 
according to their scopes under four main titles were prepared. These titles are “About the 
Extent of APM Issue in Turkey”, “About the Contributions of Civil Society Actors to the 
Accession Process”, “About the Impact of Political Landscape in Turkey to the Accession 
Process” and “About the Impact of Legal Status in Turkey to the Accession Process.” This 
information collected from the interview will complement the  case study on the Mine Ban 
Treaty, based on books, articles and other secondary resources. 
83 Detailed list of the interview questions is attached to the appendix.
84  McNamara, Carter, PhD. General Guidelines for Conducting Interviews, Minnesota, 
1999
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY 1: UNITED STATES
Although the United States said that it embraced the goal of the Mine Ban Treaty 
(MBT),  and  showed  its  support  by  donating  a  high  amount  of  financial  aid  to  mine 
clearance programs around the world, it did not sign the treaty in the face of both strong 
international and domestic pressure. Even after the end of the Cold War, the activities of the 
US military have not declined.85 About the MBT, main stance of the U.S. government has 
generally been that anti-personnel mines (APMs) deployed by the United States were not 
killing or maiming thousands of innocent civilians, such as in Cambodia or Mozambique. 
The argument is “If the United States signed the ban, it would not result in greater lives 
saved,  but  rather  in  more  lives  lost,  with  American  soldiers  absorbing  many  of  the 
casualties.”86 Since 1992, the U.S. has taken some major steps to reduce landmine use; 
however,  their  practical  use  is  still  important  under  the  current  U.S.  military doctrine. 
Resulting from pressure of campaigners of the mine ban movement, the government tried to 
develop  alternative  weapons  to  landmines  acceptable  under  the  MBT.  In  the  process, 
billions of dollars were earmarked to such research. Yet, the U.S. landmine policy is still 
incompatible with the treaty. Moreover, critics are doubtful about a prospective compliance 
with the landmine norm in the near future due to U.S's war on terrorism since September 
85 Military  expenditure  (%  of  GDP)  for  1988  is  5.8,  whereas  for  2010  4.8.  Source: 
Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI),  Yearbook:  Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security. 
86 Captain  Andrew  C.  S.  Efaw,  “The  United  States  Refusal  to  Ban  Landmines:  The 
Intersection  between  Tactics,  Strategy,  Policy,  and International  Law,”  Military  Law 
Review, Volume 159, March 1999. p. 149.
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11.  At  a  meeting  of  the  Arms  Control  Association  in  Washington  in  2002,  Jayantha 
Dhanapal, the United Nations under secretary general for disarmament affairs, told that “I 
must warn against the sacrifice of disarmament and arms control norms in the battle against 
terrorism.”87 This case study aims to underline two things. The first point it stresses is how 
the U.S. government is caught between two fires: high security concerns which demands 
the use of landmines, and strong international and domestic pressure which denounces U.S 
position towards the MBT. And the second one is how the U.S. governments for years have 
financed research and development to overcome this dilemma.
5.1. Crisis Level
5.1.1. Security concerns after the end of the Cold War and the need for Anti-
Personnel Landmines
At Cold War's end, the Gulf War  (or Operation Desert Storm)88 had an important 
role in giving direction to the US grand strategy for the Post-Cold War era. In the absence 
of Soviet threat, projections of the new strategy was trying to find a viable rationale to 
sustain the power of the U.S. military establishment. The end of the Cold War meant a 
substantial cutback in the military budget, and many welcomed this, believing the extra 
resources  will  be  directed  to  the  civilian  sector.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Gulf  War 
“institutionalized a new paradigm of combat that will in all likelihood govern US military 
planning for a generation to come:” the mid-intensity conflict.89 This new paradigm fell 
87 Barbara Crossette, “Washington Is Criticized for Growing Reluctance to Sign Treaties,” 
The New York Times, April 4, 2002.
88 Military  intervention  to  the  conflict  between  Kuwait  and  Iraq   (August  2,  1990  – 
February 28, 1991).
89 Michael T. Klare, “US Military Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” Socialist Register, 
Vol. 28 (1992). p. 131
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between a high-intensity all out war (such as between the U.S. and Soviet Union) and small 
scale low-intensity conflicts (such as counter-insurgency operations). In the post-Cold War 
era, it was clear that a high-intensity conflict in Europe was very unlikely anymore, and if  
the military only dealt with low-intensity conflicts from now on, then one-tenth the size of 
the existing US army would be sufficient for the task.90 With the aim of keeping the military 
with more or less the same size,  a new enemy,  namely Third World countries that had 
nuclear, chemical or missile capability, enter into American strategic imagination. And the 
new military paradigm, “mid-intensity conflict,” was improved to fight with these powers. 
In his article, General Vuono,  the Army Chief of Staff, talks about the rationale of this new 
paradigm: 
   “Because the United States is a global power with vital interests that must be 
protected throughout an increasingly turbulent world, we must look beyond the 
European continent  and consider  other  threats  to  our  national  security.  The 
proliferation of military power in what is often called the 'Third World' presents 
a troubling picture. Many Third World nations now possess mounting arsenals 
of  tanks,  heavy  artillery,  ballistic  missiles,  and  chemical  weapons...The 
proliferation of advanced military capabilities has given an increasing number 
of countries in the developing world the ability to wage sustained, mechanized 
land warfare. The United States cannot ignore the expanding military power of 
these countries,  and the  Army must  retain  the capability to  defeat  potential 
threats  wherever  they  occur.  This  could  mean  confronting  a  well-equipped 
army in the Third World.”91
Even though the United States are not involved in combat operations all the time, the U.S. 
forces are spread around the world, either for deterrence or as peacekeepers.92 The U.S. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Carl E. Vuono, 'Versatile, Deployable, and Lethal,' Sea Power, April 1990, pp. 57-63.
92 “As of 31 December 2010, U.S. Armed Forces were stationed in 150 countries. Some of 
the  largest  contingents  are  the  103,700 in  Afghanistan,  the  52,440 in  Germany,  the 
35,688 in Japan, the 28,500 in Republic of Korea, the 9,660 in Italy, and the 9,015 in the 
United Kingdom respectively. These numbers change frequently due to the regular recall 
and deployment of units. Altogether, 77,917 military personnel are located in Europe, 
141 in the former Soviet Union, 47,236 in East Asia and the Pacific, 3,362 in North 
Africa, the Near East, and South Asia, 1,355 in sub-Saharan Africa and 1,941 in the 
Western Hemisphere excluding the United States itself.” Source: "Active duty military 
personnel  strengths  by regional  area  and  by country,”  U.S.  Department  of  Defense. 
2010. Retrieved 31 December 2010. 
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Military is  prepared  to  counter  against  various  kinds  of  threat  to  its  national  security: 
terrorism, use of weapons of mass destruction,  small-scale contingencies,  major theater 
wars, cyber attack, information operations etc.93 According to Army Vision 2010, especially 
during major theater wars, “the Army anticipates being outnumbered and, therefore will 
depend very heavily on technological superiority,”94
Under  certain  circumstances,  landmines  are  considered  to  be  vital  for  the  U.S. 
Army.  According  to  some  scholars,  landmines  saved  lives  during  the  Gulf  War.  Two 
advancing Iraqi divisions were stopped by the minefield laid by the US Air Force during 
the Gulf war thereby protecting the left flank of the U.S. VII Corps.95 Various mines —non-
self-destructing and self-destructing, antipersonnel and antitank— were available in the US 
stockpile  during  the  Gulf  War  which  amounted  to  2.2  million  pieces  of  landmines. 
According to the Department of Defense reports, approximately 118,000 landmines which 
were only “smart”,  or  self-destructing,  were used.96 After  the  Iraqis  retreated,  the  U.S. 
minefields of smart mines were blown up. 
In short, the U.S. forces that fight ground wars rely on APMs in battlefield. The 
level of crisis in general does not appear to be diminishing since the end of the Cold War. 
As a result, the United States has to find alternatives to landmines. Seemingly, only then a 
change in the landmine policy of the United States will be observed. 
93 Alternative  Technologies  to  Replace  Antipersonnel  Landmines.  Washington,  D.C: 
National Academy Press, 2001. pg. 19
94 The U.S. Army. 1997. Army Vision 2010. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army. Also available on line: http://www.army.mil/ 2010/introduction.htm.
95 Captain  Andrew  C.  S.  Efaw,  “The  United  States  Refusal  to  Ban  Landmines:  The 
Intersection  between  Tactics,  Strategy,  Policy,  and International  Law,”  Military  Law 
Review, Volume 159, March 1999. pp. 151
96 “Information on U.S. Use of Landmines in the Persian Gulf War,” United States General 
Accounting  Office,  Report  to  the  Honorable  Lane  Evans,  House  of  Representative, 
September 2002, Also available online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d021003.pdf 
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5.1.2. Landmine Policies of the Governments of the United States 
5.1.2.1. During Clinton's term (1993-2001): “Everywhere But Korea”
On September 17, 1997, The United States declared that it would not join the MBT; 
however, President Clinton also announced that the government will stop the use of APMs 
with the exception of Korea, where landmines are considered especially important. On the 
other hand, 2006 was set as the target year when the APMs in Korea will be completely 
removed  if  the  alternatives  can  be  found.  The  United  States  legislated  a  one-year 
moratorium on exports of APMs in 1992 as a result of Senator Patrick Leahy's initiative. As 
a result, the US became the first country to enact a law about controlling the use of APMs.  
“Under  this  moratorium,  the  Department  of  State  'revoked or  suspended all  previously 
issued licenses, approvals, and LOAs [letters of authorization] authorizing the export, sale, 
or  other  transfer  of  landmines  specifically  designed  for  anti-personnel  use.'”97 The 
moratorium was extended to four years for the Fiscal Year 1994 and to five years for the 
Fiscal Year 1996.98 On January 21, 1997, President Clinton urged states to negotiate a ban 
on APMs in the Conference on Disarmament.99 He also stated that the United States would 
consider joining the MBT depending on the development of the new technology which 
would supersede the APMs. 
Research to find alternatives to dumb - non self-destructing - landmines began in 
1997  under  the  supervision  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Defense  (DOD).  A two-track 
approach  was  adopted.  The  first  track,  led  by  the  U.S.  Army,  dealt  with  the  issue  of 
developing alternatives to dumb mines in Korea that are equal in capability but acceptable 
97 Captain  Andrew  C.  S.  Efaw,  “The  United  States  Refusal  to  Ban  Landmines:  The 
Intersection  between  Tactics,  Strategy,  Policy,  and International  Law,”  Military  Law 
Review, Volume 159, March 1999. pp. 87-151.
98 Alternative  Technologies  to  Replace  Antipersonnel  Landmines.  Washington,  D.C: 
National Academy Press, 2001. pg. 15
99 “Clinton  Urges  Conference  on  Disarmament  Action  On  Fissile  Material,  and 
Landmines,” January 1997, http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1997/01/msg00028c.htm 
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under  the  requirements  of  the  MBT.  The  second  track  (DARPA Program)  focused  on 
inventing technologically advanced  landmines that effectively prevent entry to a certain 
area.
On January 7, 1997, President Clinton sent a letter to the Senate for ratification for 
Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention where he stated that “a global ban on 
APMs...is one of my top arms control priorities. At the same time, the policy recognizes 
that the United States has international commitments and responsibilities that must be taken 
into account in any negotiations on a total ban.”100  The US government had hesitations 
about  provisions  of  the  MBT.  They asked  for  a  change  in  Article  3  which  deals  with 
exceptions to the treaty. They demanded the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and 
South Korea to be accepted as an exception. The U.S. government, however, only found 
support  from a  few countries  (Australia,  Ecuador,  Poland,  Spain,  and  Venezuela).  The 
majority of the states concurred on the thought that “any exception to a treaty seeking to 
ban a certain weapon was a contradiction in terms and that if a geographic exception was 
granted to one country, other countries would also ask for their own exceptions.”101 Another 
problem was the compliance regime in the treaty. The right of withdrawal from the treaty 
during  armed  conflict  was  another  hesitation  for  the  U.S.102 The  U.S.  argued  that 
withdrawals should have also taken place during armed conflict. In this regard, Robert Bell, 
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, 
told in a White House press briefing that “Whether it's the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the START treaties, 
whatever -- 20 of the last 20 arms control treaties that we've been part of have withdrawal 
clauses that are not restricted in time of war.”103 The last major division was about anti-
handling or anti-tampering devices put near the anti-tank mine with some trip wires to 
100 Peter  Malanczuk,  “The  International  Criminal  Court  and  Landmines:  What  are  the 
Consequences of Leaving US Behind,” EJIL, 11.1 (2000). p. 87
101 Ibid. 
102 “The current text also states: “If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the 
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take 
effect before the end of the armed conflict.”  Peter Malanczuk, p. 86
103 The White House, Press Briefing, September 17, 1997, Available online at: 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/NSC91797.html 
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prevent enemy forces from attempting to pick up mines from the ground. These devices, 
integrated to the anti-tank mines, were intended to kill or injure someone who's going to get 
the  mine.  In  the  Oslo  negotiations,  the  Clinton  administration  said  that  they agreed to 
destroy even their smart – self-destructing- landmines; however, they demanded to keep the 
anti-tank  mines  with  anti-handling  devices,  claiming  that  they  were  not  anti-personnel 
landmines. Nevertheless, treaty text had a provision which exempted those kinds of devices 
from the  treaty.  Upon reaching no conclusion  in  Oslo  negotiations,  President  Clinton's 
statements  in the White House press briefing were explanatory of the dilemma the U.S. 
faced:
   “As Commander-in-Chief, I will not send our soldiers to defend the freedom 
of our people and the freedom of others without doing everything we can to 
make  them as  secure  as  possible...But  no  one  should  expect  our  people  to 
expose our Armed Forces to unacceptable risks. There is a line that I simply 
cannot cross, and that line is the safety and security of our men and women in 
uniform. We stand ready to sign a treaty that meets our fundamental and unique 
security  requirements.  We  want  to  end  even  the  use  of  smart  landmines, 
everywhere  but  Korea.  I  could  never  agree  not  to  have  anti-tank weapons, 
given the kinds of combat that our people are likely to be in, in any kind of 
projected scenario, over the next 20 to 30 years. I couldn't do it...That would be 
completely  irresponsible  for  me  to  let  our  people  be  in  combat  situations 
without an anti-tank device that I thought was the most effective available.”   104
5.1.2.1.1.  The  Demilitarized  Zone  in  Korea  (DMZ):  the  Cold  War's  Final 
Frontier
Landmines  are  often  used  tactically  during  battlefield  confrontations;  but, 
sometimes they can also be  used as  a  part  of  larger  strategic  plans,  such as  in  border 
protection.105 The DMZ in Korea is one such case which requires continuous maintenance 
of landmines to prevent border violation. During the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, both 
104 Remarks  by  the  President  on  Landmines.  The  White  House.  September  17,  1997. 
Available online at:   http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/withdrawal91797.html
105 Alternative  Technologies  to  Replace  Antipersonnel  Landmines.  Washington,  D.C: 
National Academy Press, 2001. 
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sides extensively used APMs, and many of them were forgotten afterwards. Although the 
numbers  have  decreased  and  incidents  are  rare  nowadays,  many  civilians  were  killed 
because of APMs immediately after the war. 
In the ground defense of South Korea, the role of landmines is seen as vital by the 
U.S. military. North Korea's 1.5 million man strong army with 1 million just near the border 
poses great danger in case of an attack. Attacks by North Korean massed infantry can be 
effectively  slowed  down  by  minefields.  In  1999,  General  John  H.  Tilelli,  Jr.,  then 
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and 
the U.S. Forces Korea, told before the U.S. Congress that, “these weapons…are absolutely 
vital to the success” of the mission in Korea.106 Against the danger of North Korea crossing 
the 38th parallel, landmines were used extensively for years in the area. The scenario of a 
possible military engagement includes being outnumbered by the North Korea's one million 
army that will probably attack without any single warning -one of the principles of the 
North Korean army doctrine.  In the mountainous topography between North and South 
Korea, for some military officials the best way is to use landmines to slow down and thin 
enemy ranks against a North Korean blitzkrieg.107
 North Korean forces are only 27 miles from the South Korean capital, Seoul, which 
has 11 million inhabitants. Col. Park Tong Hyong, chief of arms control verification in the 
South Korean Defense Ministry told the press that “Our defense depth is very shallow, and 
so we have to take defense measures very quickly.”108 If it had not been for landmines, 
North  Korea  could  easily  attack  to  the  South  and  reach  the  capital  city  before  any 
counterattack  could  be  organized.  On  the  other  hand,  even  though  they  would  be 
outnumbered by the Korean Army, many experts think the United States and South Korean 
forces could defeat an attack without relying on landmines. In such a situation, however, 
106 Tilelli, J. H. 1999. Testimony before the House National Security Committee by J.H. 
Tillelli, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/ Combined Forces Command 
and  Commander  United  States  Forces  Korea.  Congressional  Record.  1999  106th 
Congress. 1st Sess. Vol. 145, No. 33. 
107 Alternative  Technologies  to  Replace  Antipersonnel  Landmines.  Washington,  D.C: 
National Academy Press, 2001. p. 20
108 Nicholas D. Kristof, “South Korea Extols Some of the Benefits of Land Mines,”  The 
New York Times, September 3, 1997.
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what is expected by the U.S. army is not just ultimately winning the war; but to win with 
the least damage and military casualties. Different studies have been done to estimate what 
the effect would be if landmines were banned and not used. One of them, an American 
military study claimed that the U.S. would need around an extra 20,000 troops to halt an 
invasion. A computer simulation developed to estimate the possibilities predicted that South 
Korea and the U.S. would suffer an additional 2,500 to 3,000 casualties each day during the 
conflict.
The practical use of the minefields to slow down enemy attacks and counter the 
numerical advantage of North Korean forces has a vital role in a possible war scenario. 
Therefore, joining the MBT would mean to betray South Korea which has been an ally of 
the USA for years. During Clinton's term, the U.S. tried to make minefields between North 
and South Korea exceptional under the conditions of the MBT due to the uniqueness of the 
security situation. The government has argued that mines deployed along the Demilitarized 
Zone or other areas like this were places where there were no villages or civilians.109 On the 
other  hand,  since  the  Korean  war  ended  in  armistice,  more  than  2000  South  Korean 
civilians have become victims of landmines.110 Due to heavy rain, mines along the DMZ 
sometimes change place and drift to other areas where they cause great danger to local 
people. Others argue that both South Koreans and American troops positioned in South 
Korea, feel safer with minefields. Supporters of APMs even see them as symbols of peace 
and  security.  The  words  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Park  Yong  Ok,  the  Deputy  Defense  Minister, 
summarizes how South side views landmines: “Many people talk about the humanitarian 
aspects of land mines. Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything. If we fail to 
deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed. And the use of land mines is a  
very effective way of deterring war. From a military standpoint and from a humanitarian 
standpoint, it is clear that we need to use land mines.”111 
109 Remarks  by  the  President  on  Landmines.  The  White  House.  September  17,  1997. 
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110 Landmine  Monitor  Report  2000:  Toward  a  Mine-Free  World.  New  York,  NY: 
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5.1.2.1.2. Landmine Clearance in Guantanamo Bay:
One of the major steps taken by the U.S. was the removal of landmines along the 
Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba as a symbolic gesture after declining to sign the MBT. 
Pentagon officials always considered landmines as crucial between North and South Korea; 
however  Guantanamo  could  be  compensated  with  other  security  measures,  and  the 
minefields were costly to maintain anyway. In May 1996, President Clinton said that more 
than 50,000 mines installed at the U.S. side of the buffer zone in Guantanamo Bay would 
be destroyed and instead,  “layered defense measures including some sound and motion 
sensors  which  will  provide  the  appropriate  security”  would  be  established.112 In  total, 
twenty one minefields extending  from along the 17.5 mile barbed-wire perimeter fence 
were cleared from September 1996 until 1999.113
5.1.2.1.3. Interference in the landmine use of Pacific Island states:
In 2011, Wikileaks made public a September 2009 US Department of State cable 
from the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that indicated the US efforts to convince Pacific 
island states Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau, about not joining the MBT during 
President Clinton's term. All three countries were affected by explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) left in the aftermath of Second World War. According to the cable, on December 2, 
1997, US officials met with representatives from the three countries and discussed about 
the  possibilities  of  joining  the  MBT  under  the  restrictions  of  the  Compact  of  Free 
Association (COFA). The Marshall Islands signed the treaty in 1997; however, it  has not 
112 Captain Mike Doubleday, USN, DASD, DoD News Briefing, 20 January 1998. 
113 Email to Landmine Monitor from JOC Walter T. Ham IV, Public Affairs Officer, US 
Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, 23 April 2001, taken from Landmine Monitor 2004. 
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yet ratified it. According to the cable, Palau acceded to the treaty in 2007 because it was 
“determined that the Ottawa Convention did not conflict with the COFA.”114 In the meeting, 
the  US said  that  the  decision  to  accede  to  the  MBT is  up  to  the  governments  of  the 
countries; however, the US also acknowledged that it will not sign it anytime soon, and 
adherence by the COFA states could cause a conflict with defense provisions of the bilateral 
agreement.  These  defense  provisions  were  described  as  “unique,  especially  the  U.S. 
commitment to defending the Republic of the Marshall Islands as if it were part of the 
United States.”115
5.1.2.2. During Bush's term (2001-2009): “Our Landmine Policy is  Better than the 
MBT”
The Pentagon requested $688 million for research and $1,08 billion for production 
of alternatives to APMs when George W. Bush and his administration came to power. With 
this budget, the Pentagon developed a landmine system called “man-in-the-loop.” This new 
landmine  system gave  the  ability  to  detonate  a  mine  by  a  controller  miles  away.  For 
landmines have indiscriminate effects, this feature was designed to make the weapon more 
discriminate.116 Other developments were about delimiting the effects  of landmines to a 
certain period of time. Combinations of two features were designed for this purpose:
 Self-destruction (SD) mines detonate after a set period of time between four hours 
and  fifteen  days  which  is  acceptable  according  to  the  CCW's  Amended  Mines 
Protocol.  These mines are tested under  vibration,  high/low humidity,  shock, and 
exposure to chemicals such as sulfuric acid or salt. Unreliability of SD APMs is 
114 According to the COFA, three sovereign states have become 'associated states' with the 
United States.  In  exchange for  full  international  defense authority,  the United States 
provides financial resource. 
115 Landmine Monitor Report. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2012.
116 Matt  Schaaf  and  Scott  Stedjan,  “If  It  Looks  Like  a  Landmine,  Smells  Like  a 
Landmine...” Foreign Policy in Focus, August 25, 2006.
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statistically very low. The United Nations mine clearance reliability rate is 99.6% 
and SD APMs' reliability even exceeds that rate.
 Self-deactivation (SDA) is the backup mechanism of SD APMs. The battery inside 
the mine is a separate part, and if the self-destruction does not occur, the mine goes 
off  inevitably when the  battery discharges  within  the  limited  90  days  life  span. 
Therefore, every produced mine will be dud after 90 days, even if they don't explode 
on their own. 90 days life span is below the specified day limit according to the 
CCW's Amended Mines Protocol which is 120 days.117
After President Bush came into power, eight retired U.S. generals and admirals sent 
him a letter that stated APMs were “outmoded weapons that have, time and again, proved 
to  be  a  liability  to  our  own  troops.  We  believe  that  the  military,  diplomatic  and 
humanitarian advantages of speedy U.S. accession [to the Mine Ban Treaty] far outweigh 
the minimal military utility of these weapons.”118 But one of the first matters that the new 
administration dealt was the landmine policy. The Bush administration’s new policy about 
landmines totally disregarded the MBT and frustrated the expectations that first started with 
the Clinton administration. George W. Bush stated that the U.S. might have well deployed 
mines in Iraq or elsewhere if need be.  The US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) 
immediately condemned this new policy and called the U.S. government to join the treaty. 
Senator Leahy of Vermont told during a press briefing that 
   “Though there are some positive aspects of this policy, on the whole it is 
a  deeply  disappointing  step  backward.  This  is  another  squandered 
opportunity for US leadership on a crucial arms control and humanitarian 
issue. Worst of all, in a sharp departure from past policy, it says the United 
States will continue using landmines indefinitely. We are by far the most 
powerful nation on earth, and the world looks to us for leadership on this 
issue. When we back away from the progress we have pledged to rid the 
world of  these  indiscriminate weapons,  others  will  ask why they,  with 
their much weaker armed forces, should stop using them.”119 
117 Landmine Policy White Paper, US Department of State, February 27, 2004. 
118 “Mine Ban Advocates Denounce White House Decision to Retain Landmines and 
Abandon Mine Ban Treaty,” Available online: http://www.commondreams.org/news2004/0227-
07.htm 
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Unfortunately, the previous deadline for the U.S. to join the MBT, was canceled by 
the Bush's new landmine policy. Although the new administration increased the funds of 
mine  actions  programs  by  fifty  percent  for  Fiscal  Year  2005,  its  insistence  on  using 
landmines - even if they are 'smart'- welcomed with much criticism.120 
On the  other  hand,  some people  also  praised  Bush's  new landmine  policy.  The 
policy treated  anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines alike and banned all mines which were 
not detectable and non-persistent. Richard L. Garwin, who chaired the Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation Advisory Board in the Clinton administration, told that the new policy 
addressed the landmine issue more effectively than other initiatives (including the MBT).121 
The persistent, or 'dumb', mines whether anti-personnel or anti-vehicle, can remain without 
being detected for years, and such anti-vehicle mines are completely unacceptable by the 
MBT. According to Garwin, when people talk about a "mine-free world,” it is almost like 
they are referring to a world where there are no anti-personnel mines. He claims that the 
two are not the same, and the real threat is not anti-personnel mines in itself but rather if the 
mine is persistent or not. 
On  February 27, 2004, a statement about the new United States landmine policy 
was issued by the Department of State:
   “Rather than dwell on past differences, President Bush's new policy looks 
forward with vision, breaks new humanitarian ground and makes the U.S. the 
first major military power to address the key issue of why landmines present a 
humanitarian problem and to apply the solution to anti-vehicle mines as well 
as anti-personnel mines. Previous policies and the Mine Ban Treaty dealt only 
with anti-personnel landmines. President Bush's new policy addresses the true 
humanitarian  issue  of  all  persistent  (dumb)  landmines,  regardless  of  their 
type.”122
The new landmine policy was designed to relieve “the most pressing humanitarian 
impacts of explosive remnants of war (ERW), with a 'mine-impact free' objective rather 
120 Ibid.
121 Richard  L.  Garwin,  “Beyond  the  Ottawa  treaty:  On  land  mines,  America  is  a 
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than a more costly 'mine free' policy.”123 The MBT has overshot the mark by also including 
smart (non-persistent) mines that self-destruct or self-deactivate themselves. According to 
the state officials in the Bush administration, with such existing technology, the U.S. serve 
as a model for the MBT. 
5.1.2.3. During Obama's term (2009 - ): “Pentagon isn't Ready to Renounce APMs”
The current U.S. landmine policy, released under the Bush administration in 2004, 
requires halting the use and stockpile of all the persistent mines by late 2010. The use of 
smart non-persistent mines, however, is not intended to be prohibited. Long term mine ban 
activist  Dr.  James  Cobey  has  told  that  unlike  past  Defense  Departments,  the  senior 
leadership at the Pentagon are now backing the idea of joining the MBT. He also added that 
the Obama administration probably will not submit the treaty for ratification to the U.S. 
Senate until after the coming elections in 2012, and further continuation of using  Spider 
Networked Munition Systems which are incompatible with the MBT indicate Pentagon is 
not completely ready to dump APMs.124 In 2009, the U.S. Department of State spokesperson 
Ian Kelly announced that “We would not be able to meet our national defense needs nor our 
security commitments to our friends and allies if we signed this,” before a meeting on the 
treaty.125 The  following  day,  this  statement  arouse  fierce  protest  from  civil  society, 
International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines  (ICBL),  human  rights  groups  and  non-
governmental  organizations.  Thereupon,  the  administration  made  a  statement  that  the 
policy is still under review, and the announcement of spokesperson was premature. State 
officials had never said they started such a review before. Human Rights Watch said that 
123 Army Arms Control Implementation policy, Army Regulation 525-92, August 2, 2010. 
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the review must have been done without including other relevant parties such as foreign 
allies, independent experts or non-governmental organizations.126 One senior official said 
the  “negative  blowback”  shortly  after  the  announcement  enabled  a  more  serious  and 
comprehensive revision.127 Furthermore, the Obama administration sent a delegation to the 
Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty. The head of the U.S. delegation told,  
“The Administration's decision to attend this Review Conference is the result of an on-
going  comprehensive  review  of  the  U.S.  landmine  policy  initiated  at  the  direction  of 
President Obama.”128 
On March 22, 2010, 65 non-governmental organizations sent a letter to President 
Obama, urging him to conclude a decision of the review as soon as possible. Another letter 
was from 68 Senators, more than two-thirds of the Senate, expressing their concern about 
the U.S. position on landmines and supporting the involvement of the U.S. to the MBT. The 
senatorial  letter  sent  together  with  an  identical  letter  from  members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives. The letters also stated, “We are confident that…the Administration can 
identify  any  obstacles  to  joining  the  [Mine  Ban]  Convention  and  develop  a  plan  to 
overcome them as soon as possible.”129 The Senate letter was prepared by Senators Patrick 
Leahy (Democrat) and George Voinovich (Republican), and the House letter was prepared 
by Representatives Jim McGovern (Democrat) and Darrell Issa (Republican). Moreover, 
the letters addressed two issues which had been controversial for a long time: landmines in 
the  Korean  Demilitarized  Zone  (DMZ),  and  whether  replacing  the  landmines  with  an 
alternative  is  necessary.  The  letters  argued  that  landmines  along  the  DMZ  are  the 
responsibility of South Korea. Also, according to the letters, changes made in doctrine and 
tactics can replace landmines rather than another alternative weapon.130
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In June 2011, however, the review started to stall due to the U.S. response to the 
“Arab Spring” as one official said. The administration's review does not have a deadline to 
be completed. Seemingly, however, one thing is clear that is if the Bush administration's 
policy is retained, then the U.S. will never be able to join the MBT. 
5.2. Domestic Impact of the Norm 
In the United States, political internalization of the landmine norm is considerably 
well developed. The U.S. is one of the earliest  countries which supported humanitarian 
demining programs, such as in Afghanistan in 1988. The U.S. has provided assistance to 
mine-affected countries since the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program was established 
in 1993.  Between 1993 and 2004, the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program  donated 
almost  $800 million in  46 countries  for  humanitarian  mine action.131 One of  the  many 
demining  initiatives  in  the  U.S.  is  undertaken  by the  Interagency Working  Groups  on 
Humanitarian Demining, chaired by the U.S. Department of State with the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) as vice-chair. This institution's task is to develop and administrate the 
U.S. humanitarian demining policies and programs. Among many, some of the aims of 
these programs are educating local people about landmines, teaching them what to do when 
they find a landmine, providing assistance to victims, and teaching indigenous institutions 
about  demining  techniques.132 The  U.S.  Army Engineer  School's  Countermine  Training 
Support Center is responsible of teaching the process of demining projects, and promoting 
mine awareness. 
131 Fact Sheet on the New United States Landmine Policy, The U.S. Department of State, 
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President Clinton is the first leader who called for a global ban on APMs in 1994 
when he gave a speech before  the UN General Assembly. In May 1997, the Unexploded 
Ordinance Center of Excellence at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was built by the Department of 
Defense  to  develop  technology to  overcome  unexploded  ordinance  problem.133 USAID 
established the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund in 1989, an institution which donates 
millions of dollars in assistance to APM victims. The fund supports many activities that 
relieve victims of war, as well as landmine victims, in 15 countries “with a total investment  
of  more  than  $50  million  worth  of  technical  and  material  support.”134 The  political 
internalization of the landmine norm, however, is undermined by the fact that each year 
since 1997 the US abstains from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 
about  the universalization and full  implementation of  the MBT. In 2011, the US again 
abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 66/29.
There are many civil groups working on the landmine issue in the United States. 
Zach Hudson, the Coordinator of the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) argued 
that the 
   “Accession to the Mine Ban Treaty continues to enjoy exceptionably 
broad civil society support here in the United States. As this continued 
dialogue  with  the  President  [Obama]  indicates,  a  vast  number  of 
prominent  nongovernmental  organizations  —many of  whom have seen 
first  hand  the  devastating  impact  of  landmines  in  the  communities  in 
which  they  work—unquestionably  support  the  total  prohibition  of  this 
weapon and its lethal effect on civilians.”135 
This is also a result of the liberal domestic structure of the United States. In the 
landmine case, we can clearly see that the United States policy-making process is open with 
respect to the institutional features of  the state to be influenced by societal actors. Risse-
Kappen calls such states as 'society-dominated' states and gives examples of USA, Hong 
133 "Chapter  VI:  The  International  Response,"  in  Hidden  Killers,  1998:  The  Global  
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Kong and Philippines.136 In  such states,  social  interest  pressure  is  strong,  and political 
institutions are fragmented. When elite learning is not the case, such as in polities with 
liberal domestic structure, civil actors are more open to get involved in politics. Although 
this does not mean they are more involved or more willing to get involved in politics than 
their counterparts in less liberal countries; but certainly they have more elbowroom while 
doing so. They can pressure the government to take more measures against weapons and 
urge decision-makers to be more respectful of human rights. It is small wonder that the 
domestic impact of the landmine norm will be higher in such a liberal structure. Because 
the  circle  of  actors  in  politics  is  large,  NGOs  work  more  dispersedly.  In  less  liberal 
countries,  NGOs  will  probably  tend  to  work  more  closely  with  the  government  than 
organizing mass demonstrations, engage in lobbying acts and try to have closer relationship 
with policy-makers. In conclusion, the liberal domestic structure of the U.S. enabled it to be 
easily responsive to societal pressure. 
The  USCBL has been the main branch of organizing against APMs. The Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Handicap International, and Medico International 
were helping out victims of landmines in Cambodia and Vietnam. Due to excessive amount 
of injuries,  they decided to step in and deal with the source of the problem. Soon they 
started to work together with other several non-governmental organizations, and officially 
established USCBL in 1992. In order to organize a campaign against APMs, VVAF hired 
activist Jody Williams. After several years, the campaign turned into massive grass-roots 
movement which ultimately gave birth to an international network including over 1,000 
organizations and more than 60 countries. Annual meetings held to discuss the strategy of 
the movement with the intention of initiating a global ban on APMs.137 
In 1996, an open letter published by 15 retired senior military officers stating that 
APMs are not essential  to  protect national security,  thus a ban would create a security 
deficit neither for the U.S. nor for the allies. The officers also said, “We view such a ban as 
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not only humane, but also militarily responsible.”138 Many lobbying groups also pressured 
the  Bush  administration  during  the  Iraq  War  not  to  use  anti-vehicle  or  anti-personnel 
landmines.139 When  Obama  administration  announced  in  2009  that  the  Bush  landmine 
policy will be taken under comprehensive review, many support letters were sent for the 
MBT to the government by 68 Senators, 16 Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, several NATO 
allies,  retires  senior  military officers,  APM victims,  many NGO leaders  and individual 
activists in 2010. Due to the lag in the process of landmine policy review, leaders from 76 
NGOs sent another support letter to the administration in spring 2012 asking the President 
to facilitate the process and conclude as soon as possible. The latest letter coincided with 
the international Lend Your Leg campaign that aimed to raise mine awareness and arouse 
interest on landmine victims. The campaign launched on March 1 was planned as a part of 
the United Nations April 4th International Day for Mine Awareness. During the campaign 
many  United  Nations  officials,  celebrities,  journalists,  politicians,  as  well  as  ordinary 
people rolled up their pant leg to show they “lend their leg” as a sign of awareness of the  
global APM problem.140 
According  to  a  published  report  by  the  Institute  for  Energy and Environmental 
Research  and  the  Lawyers'  Committee  on  Nuclear  Policy,  the  binding  international 
agreements received a blow especially during late 90's in the United States. The report, 
“The Rule of Power or the Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions 
Regarding  Security-Related  Treaties,”  states  Washington  abstained  signing  various 
agreements from nuclear testing or landmines to climate change or the rights of women and 
children.141 On the other hand, most of the time the US has promoted disarmament treaties 
such  as   the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention  or  Convention  on  Conventional  Weapons 
(CCW). Additionally, the US is also party to the International Test and Evaluation Program 
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for Humanitarian Demining and different Geneva Conventions about laws of war.142 The 
U.S.  also  wanted  to  include  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  as  another  platform for 
deliberations about the landmine problem.
5.3 Conclusion
 U.S. military involvement in conflicts around the world has continued in the post-
Cold  War era.  Due to  increasing pressures  from the  international  mine-ban movement, 
Washington tried to compensate the need for APMs with alternative weapons. The smart 
mine  technology  which  contains  a  self-destruct/self-deactivation  mechanism,  or  anti-
handling  devices  for  anti-vehicle  landmines  did  not  provide  a  solution  to  the  U.S.'s 
landmine problem to  date.  Surely,  smart  mine  technology reduces  the  life  span of  the 
landmine but the lethality stays the same. Apparently, the United States is caught in the 
middle, pressured by both civil society actors and ongoing security needs. This case study 
puts forward the effect  of the domestic impact  of the norm in the U.S. which actively 
influenced policy-making from time to time but fell short to create an all out change in 
state behavior due to concerns about national security.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY 3: TURKEY
Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003 and became a State 
Party to the treaty when the law entered into force on 1 March 2004. This  meant that 
Turkey had to destroy all of its stockpiles until 1 March 2008, demine all minefields until 
2014 and take necessary steps about assistance to landmine victims. At the peak of the early 
success of the MBT, Turkey has signed bilateral agreements about banning landmine use 
along the borders with Georgia, Bulgaria and Greece, as a sign of good intentions and to 
contribute to regional stability. However, as a country where national security notions are 
dominant on its security policies, Turkey's long-running war with the Kurdish rebel group, 
PKK, led to the further securitization of political demands in the country and high security 
concerns kept the country back from signing the treaty. Once Abdullah Ocalan, the leader 
of the outlawed organization, was caught and high security conditions had given way to 
more  moderate  levels,  a  discursive  space  had  opened  for  “catalyzing  reforms  on  the 
Kurdish  issue  that  had  previously  been  deemed  impossible.”143 Turkey's  announcement 
about the humanitarian impact of the APMs to civilian population and the process of its 
accession to the MBT coincided with such political conditions. A careful study of internal 
dynamics in Turkey through the process reveals that high security concerns lie at the heart 
of  diffusion  of  the  norm  against  landmines.  Furthermore,  local  allies of  transnational 
advocacy groups have an important role in the internalization of the landmine-ban norm in 
Turkey. This last finding is further supported by the interview with the coordinator of the 
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT).
143 Soner Cagaptay and Ali Koknar, “PKK/KONGRA-GEL and Terrorism,” Policy Watch 
No. 877, June 25, 2004. 
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6.1. Status of Landmines in Turkey
According to the Landmine Monitor, Turkey first used APMs after 1950s to prevent 
“illegal  crossings  of  the  border.”  The  main  reason  behind  these  crossings  are  illegal 
trafficking with border neighbors, especially with Syria. Turkey’s shared borders with the 
countries in its Southeastern and Eastern region were mined, therefore, most of the APMs 
were laid in border provinces such as Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Ardahan. Turkey later laid 
mines to the inner parts of the country, too. Within the framework of Turkey’s own “war on 
terrorism”, approximately 40,000 APMs were placed around security installations in East 
and  Southeast  regions  between  1989-1992 because  of  security  reasons.  The  army also 
extensively laid APMs in many civilian dwelling units and evacuated villages under a state 
of emergency (OHAL) in order to cut the logistical support for PKK rebels. For this reason, 
most of the deaths and injuries caused by landmines happened around village roads and 
dwellings near the frontier and military installations. The Article 7 of the MBT regarding 
transparency  measures  requires  constant  notification  of  updated  information  by  State 
Parties.  Article  7 reports  indicate that  minefields  in  Turkey are appropriately fenced in 
accordance with international and NATO standards. Nevertheless, domestic NGOs doubt 
the truth of this information.
6.2. Crisis Level 
 
On  5  January  1975,  Nurettin  Yilmaz,  a  Member  of  the  Parliament  (MP)  from 
Mardin, and his 45 colleagues submitted a proposal about opening a parliamentary research 
on mine clearance in the lands along the Syrian border in the Southeast region.144 These 
144 Turkish Grand National Assembly, Research Commission Report No. 10/14, January 28, 
1977. 
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vast lands was mined to prevent  trafficking between 1956 and 1959 at  the time of the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. The group warned the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly  (TGNA)  about  these  vast  lands  and  several  MPs  argued  that  Syrians  had 
demined some part of it and have been cultivating their land. They stated that detection 
measures of crime and landmines were not a solution for trafficking; instead, economic, 
social  and  cultural  investments  should  have  been  brought  to  the  region.  The  proposal 
offered to clear the minefield completely and allocate it to peasants in the region. As a 
result of this attempt, it was argued, some 40,000 landless families could have a land of 
their  own  and  consequently  illegal  trafficking  incidents  would  drop  off  instantly. 
Humanitarian  concerns  were  inherent  in  the  proposal;  however,  the  problem  was 
understood  more  in  economic  terms:  the  underdeveloped  Southeast  region  needed  this 
fertile minefield for agricultural production. The minefield posed danger to the Turkish side 
and it was an obstacle to farm the land, thus leading a loss in economy. At the time of this 
proposal, there was no separatist armed group in Turkey despite the existence of a fiery 
political environment that included various ideological factions. Another TGNA research 
commission report was prepared by nineteen  MPs in 1996 with the intention of informing 
the National Assembly about measures that should have been taken with regard to borders.
145 The  nature  of  the  two  proposals  are  very  different.  On  the  one  hand,  1975-76 
commission report built on both humanitarian and economic concerns, on the other hand 
the  1996  report  is  entirely  about  strengthening  the  border  security  and  minimize  the 
violation of borders by drug smugglers and the PKK militants. The 1975-76 report was 
renouncing  the  use  of  landmines  on  the  Syrian  border  and proposing  the  clearance  of 
minefields. While the 1996 report mostly mentioned that the minefields should have been 
opened to agriculture, it was essentially pointing out the need for a better technological 
equipment  for  border  security.  Furthermore,  it  was  still  offering  to  keep  deploying 
landmines along a thin line near the Syrian border to ensure the security of critical spots. 
The group believed that there were approximately twenty PKK camps which had 1400-
1600 militants inhabiting in the Syrian territory. The report offered increasing the measures 
against trespassers and adopting new technology (such as Askarad radars, thermal cameras, 
steel towers and night vision devices) along with APMs. The report concluded with saying 
that since these fertile lands were not of use in terms of security, therefore they should be 
145 Turkish Grand National Assembly, Research Commission Report No. 10/7, S.S: 174. 
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opened to agriculture. At the time of this proposal, heavy armed struggle was continuing 
between the PKK and the Turkish army. Almost every month, PKK was attacking village 
guards,  teachers,  buildings,  train stations,  banks or  police  offices.  During this  time the 
Turkish  government  was  aware  of  the  international  initiative  to  ban  anti-personnel 
landmines (APMs). In 1996, Turkey declared a 3-year moratorium on APM exports and 
transfers as an expression of the determination to contribute to the international efforts on 
preventing the damage that landmines caused.
When asked about signing the MBT, Tuluy Tanc, an official at Turkey’s Permanent 
Mission to the United Nations told that Turkey was “very much interested in signing on,” 
however, present security conditions related to geographical position and border neighbors 
in the Southeast did not allow the country to sign the treaty.146 Another example showing 
Ankara's hesitation was of an unidentified Turkish official who quoted in 1997 as saying, 
“[W]e have to protect our borders. Although we respect the reasons for that treaty, in order 
to keep our borders secure, we have to take measures.”147 
On 15 April 1998, the Turkish army caught Semdin Sakik, the PKK's second most 
important leader, in Northern Iraq.148 6 months later, before the 3-year moratorium expired, 
Turkey declared that it further extended the moratorium for another 3 years. During the 
same year, Turkey voted in favor of the General Assembly Resolution 53/L.33149 which had 
a similar language to the United Nations Resolution that called all states to sign the MBT. 
According to Landmine Monitor, this indicated a new receptivity on the part of Turkey.150 
Meanwhile,  after  intense  Turkish  military  pressure  on  Syria,  the  Syrian  government 
expelled Abdullah Ocalan on 9 October 1998. Ocalan went to Greece but Greek officials 
wanted him to leave. Before he headed to Kenya, he stopped by in Rome, Moscow and 
146 Landmine Monitor Report. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999.  p. 818.
147 "Turkey: Citing Security Concerns, Ankara Opposes the Ban,” Turkish Daily News, 4 
December 1997. 
148 “PKK Yilanina Agir Darbe,” Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, April 29, 1998. 
149 A UN Resolution about humanitarian and disaster relief assistance to certain countries 
including  some  special  economic  assistance.  This  resolution  referred  to  the 
indiscriminate use of landmines in unstable countries and called states to be sensitive 
about this problem. 
150 Landmine Monitor Report. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999.  p. 819.
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Greece several times since no country was willing to grant him asylum. On 15 February, 
Kenyan government officials went to the Greek Embassy where Ocalan was staying and 
told  the  Greek  Ambassador  that  Ocalan's  presence  in  Kenya  put  overseas  Kenyan 
diplomatic missions under great risk of terrorist attacks. The officials finally took Ocalan to 
take him to the airport. On the way to the Nairobi Airport, they changed route to a different 
place where they would meet Turkish officials. Later that day, Ocalan was arrested by the 
Turkish  authority.151 The  news captured  headlines  the  following  day and  had immense 
repercussions for a long time. 
On 1 March 1999, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force and was opened to the 
accession of other states. Since Turkey did not sign the MBT, it once again extended the 
1996 moratorium for another three years after the extension in 1998, “as an expression of 
its commitment to the humanitarian objectives” of the treaty.152 On 22 March 1999, Turkey 
signed an agreement with Bulgaria banning the use of landmines on the two sides of their 
common borders.  In a joint  statement,  the two parties  have said,  “The Agreement also 
envisages  a  verification  regime....[B]y  signing  this  Agreement  the  two  countries  have 
proved  their  determination  to  contribute  to  the  ongoing  efforts  of  the  international 
community  aimed  at  the  total  elimination  of  this  inhumane  weapon.”153 In  the  TGNA 
Commission Reports regarding the agreement, it was said that among the border neighbors 
only  Greece  and  Bulgaria  signed  the  MBT and  there  was  no  apparent  attempt  from 
Turkey’s Southeastern neighbors to this end. The report openly said that, 
   “Actually,  the  fact  that  landmines  are  indiscriminately being used, 
especially by the terrorist organization in the region as mentioned, plays 
an important role in our country's refrainment from signing the Mine Ban 
Treaty  in  this  process.  Turkey,  however,  concludes  that  bilateral  and 
151 Human Rights Association, “Human Rights Report 2003,” available at www.ihd.org.tr 
152 The Republic  of Turkey,  Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  “Press releases regarding anti-
personnel land mines” No. 37, March 15, 2002. 
153 Joint Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Repubic of Turkey, H.E. Ismail 
Cem  and  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria,  H.E.  Ms. 
Nadezhda Mihhailova, Sofia, 22 March 1999, on the “Agreement between the Republic 
of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on non-use of Anti-Personnel Mines and their 
Removal from or Destruction in the Areas Adjacent to their Common Borders.” Taken 
from Landmine Monitor 1999, p. 819.
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regional level measures can also contribute to the humanitarian goals of 
the treaty.”154 
The report also states that Turkey had already initiated projects of mine clearance 
around some of its borders with neighbors “after taking the opinions of military authority 
into  account.”  These  findings  strongly  support  that  the  decision  to  take  steps  towards 
complying  with  the  landmine-ban  norm was  being  done  under  the  supervision  of  the 
military. Additionally, the successful pressure of international civil society can be clearly 
observed in spite of the high crisis level. Turkey tried to take further steps in favor of the 
norm; however, the crisis situation impeded the norm diffusion. 
On 26 March 1999, the Landmine Monitor conducted an interview with an official 
of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations. The official told that landmines 
did  play  an  important  role,  especially  in  the  Southeast  where  mountainous  geography 
allowed terrorists to easily enter the country.155 She further stated that Turkey was more 
supportive  of  a  global  anti-landmine  movement  recently.156 In  May  1999,  Turkey 
participated  the  First  Meeting  of  States  Parties  held  in  Maputo,  Mozambique  as  an 
observer. It was in this conference that Turkey declared a precise time period to commit to 
the MBT. In the conference, the Turkish delegate said “the security situation around Turkey 
so far preclude[s] my country from signing the Ottawa Convention.” and stated that Turkey 
could sign the MBT “at the beginning of the next decade if present conditions would not 
change adversely.”157 
There have been three ceasefires with PKK up until 1999. Shortly after Ocalan's 
arrest  in  February 1999,  the  PKK declared  truce  under  the  order  of  its  leader.  “When 
Abdullah Ocalan was caught, almost everyone was hopeful of peace and people thought the 
154 “Commission  Report  of  the  Ministry  of  National  Defense  and  Foreign  Affairs 
Concerning  the  Ratification  of  Landmine  Ban  Agreement  Between  Government  of 
Turkish  Republic  and  Government  of  Bulgarian  Republic,”  Turkish  Grand  National 
Assembly Term: 21, Parliamentary Year: 1, July 6, 1999.
155 Landmine Monitor interview with official at Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United 
Nations, 26 March 1999. Taken from Landmine Monitor, 1999. 
156 Ibid.
157 Landmine  Monitor  Report  2000:  Toward  a  Mine-Free  World.  New  York,  NY: 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2000.
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15-year armed struggle is now over.”158 Ocalan, while his trial was going on, has called for 
an end to  the armed struggle and ordered the withdrawal of about  3,000 -  5,000 PKK 
militants into Northern Iraq. Even a group of eight PKK militants came to Turkey and 
surrendered all together as a sign of good intentions in October 1999. Ocalan argued, the 
surrender shows how much the PKK was serious about ending the long-running armed 
struggle for Kurdish self-rule.159 He declared that he wanted a democratic solution for the 
Kurds, instead of separatism.160 He further stated he could work for the establishment of 
peace and help to stop the bloodshed if the Turkish government spared his life. Many Kurds 
backed Ocalan's call for a democratic solution.161 The PKK's leadership council issued a 
statement saying they supported “a democratic solution to be realized through peace and 
brotherhood.”162 This  ceasefire  had  the  early  signs  of  carrying  the  Kurdish  issue  to  a 
political  level.  Upon a question,  Feridun Celik,  the mayor of Diyarbakir  in  1999, said, 
“Why should I need a visa to go to Istanbul? We Kurds want to remain part of Turkey. All 
we want is to express ourselves freely as Kurds.”163 In the Seventh Party Congress of the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in September 2000, the organization officially announced 
that their goal is to have an autonomous Kurdish region, instead of a separate state. This last 
ceasefire  of  90's  lasted  5  years  and  ended  on 1  June 2004 due to  continuing  military 
operations  of  Turkish  government,  lagging  political  reforms  and  prison  conditions  of 
Ocalan. Early signs of abandoning the truce came in late 2003. On 2 September, Mizgin 
Sen, a spokeswoman for PKK, announced that the '99 ceasefire was impossible to maintain 
owing to Turkish government's  hesitation about  granting political  and cultural  rights to 
Kurds.164 Another  reason  was  that  the  Turkish  army had objected  a  bilateral  ceasefire, 
claiming that there cannot be any negotiation with a terrorist group. Cagaptay argues there 
158 “Gecmisten Bugune PKK Ateskesleri,” CNNTurk, June 28, 2010. 
159 “Still On Their Feet,” The Economist, October 21, 1999. 
160 “Ocalan Urges End to Fighting,” BBC News, June 1, 1999. 
161 “Analysis: PKK Follows Its Leader,” BBC News, June 2, 1999. 
162 “PKK Backs Ocalan Peace Call,” BBC News, June 2, 1999.
163 “Will Ocalan Die?” The Economist, July 1, 1999. 
164 “Kurdish rebels Abandon truce,” BBC News, September 2, 2003. 
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had  been  a  political  liberalization  in  the  aftermath  of  the  '99  ceasefire.  “As  violence 
subsided,”  Cagaptay  says,  “Turkey  relaxed.  Significant  reforms  followed,  including 
enhanced Kurdish education-  and new laws comparable to the U.S. Constitution's  First 
Amendment.”165 
Although the official position of the Turkish government did not change after the '99 
unilateral ceasefire, the level of violence drastically waned. In June 2000, The Chief of 
General Staff reported that, “As a result of successful operations, the number of terrorists in 
the country reduced to 50% in 1997, to 42% in 1998 and to 26% in 1999. Currently 11% of 
the terrorists are still in the country. The number of incidents had gone down from 3,298 in 
1994 to 45 in 2000. The number of killed citizens had gone down from 1,479 to 15. The 
number of killed soldiers decreased from 1,145 to 29.”166 It was doubtful, however, that this 
success was due to army operations or Ocalan's commands to PKK for non-violence. 
Close  relations  with  Syria  at  the  beginning  of  2000  and  the  decline  in  PKK 
terrorism brought clearance of minefields to the agenda of Turkey.167 The Initiative for a 
Mine-Free  Turkey (IMFT)  welcomed the  official  statements  about  a  possible  demining 
project near the Syrian border and deemed it as the most important development in 2000. 
The then Minister of Interior affairs, Saadettin Tantan, has prepared a proposal which said: 
“Following  the  technological  improvements  in  the  border  security  equipment  and  the 
complete elimination of the terror threat, the necessary preparations began to demine the 
minefields along the Syrian border with the intention of ensuring border security.”168 
In  January  2001,  Turkey  made  another  bilateral  agreement  banning  the  use  of 
landmines on the common border, this time with its eastern neighbor, Georgia. Two parties 
committed to demine the zones along the border and prohibited future use. Similar bilateral 
negotiations  have  been made in  the  same year  with  Azerbaijan  as  well.  In  the  TGNA 
Commission Report of the Foreign Affairs concerning the agreement with Georgia, several 
reasons, which paved the way for a positive evaluation of the MBT, were given in detail.  
Accomplishments in the struggle against terror, the statement from the military authority 
165 Soner Cagaptay, “Time to Shut Down the PKK,” Policy Watch, September 12, 2003.
166 Human Rights Foundation of Turkey Annual Report, 2000. p. 4
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telling APMs were  not  of  necessity anymore  and increasing  sensitivity of  international 
community towards landmine use were given as the reasons.
In  March  2001,  the  Greek  Minister  of  Defense,  Akis  Cuhacopulos,  made  an 
interview with a Turkish newspaper, explaining the new defense doctrine of Greece.169 He 
stated  that  Greece  was  ready  to  take  new  confidence  building  measures  in  the 
Mediterranean because of the declining Turkish threat. Some of the confidence building 
measures were the elimination of minefields along the Maritsa River - the common border- 
and to reduce the number of soldiers under 100,000. On 6 April 2001, Turkey officially 
declared the start of accession process to the MBT and not long after a joint declaration by 
foreign affairs ministers stated that the intention was to become State Parties at the same 
time. 
In  January 2002,  Turkey's  moratorium on the  export  and transfer  of  APMs has 
expired and the government decided to prolong the moratorium indefinitely in March in 
order  to  show continuing  adherence  to  the  MBT.  Around  the  same  time,  Turkey also 
reported that it destroyed 10,638 APMs in 2001. On 15 March 2002 at a press release, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally announced that “After careful consideration, Turkey has 
now  decided  to  accede  to  the  Ottawa  Convention...Turkey  has  come  to  the  stage  of 
submitting the Convention to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for finalization of the 
accession procedures.”170 One year later, the TGNA approved the related legal regulation 
and  Armed  forces  started  planning  the  destruction  of  APM  stockpile.  At  last,  Turkey 
completed its accession process in September 2003 and the regulation came into force in 
March 2004. 
In its letter date January 2002, PKK has said it supported a total ban on APMs to 
Geneva  Call,  a  Sweden  based  non-governmental  organization  “dedicated  to  engaging 
armed non-State actors towards compliance with the norms of international humanitarian 
law and human rights law.”171 In July 2006, it was reported that the PKK signed the Geneva 
169 “Mayinlari Atiyoruz,” Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, March 23, 2001. 
170 Landmine Monitor Report, 2002: Toward a Mine-Free World. New York: Human Rights 
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Call  Deed of Commitment for adherence to a total ban on APMs and for cooperation in 
mine action.
6.3. Domestic Impact of the Norm
One element of domestic impact of a norm in a country is its legal internalization, or 
in other words how much the norm's tenets are embedded in domestic laws. Turkey is a 
State Party for many arms control and disarmament treaties. Turkey became party to the 
Treaty  on  Non-Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  1979,  the  Biological  Weapons 
Convention in 1974, the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime in 1997, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2000. Turkey has signed 
the  Convention  on  Conventional  Weapons  and  ratified  its  Amended  Protocol  II  on 
landmines in 2005. Turkey has also declared support to the Proliferation Security Initiative 
launched by the USA in 2003. The Turkish Criminal Code No: 5237  regulates Turkey's 
counter-proliferation policies in the internal law. 
Turkey, a State Party to the MBT since 2004 does not have a specific domestic law 
for  the  implementation  of  the  MBT.  In  accordance  with  the  Turkish  constitution, 
international agreements directly have legal effect when ratified by the parliamentary. On 
the other hand, domestic NGOs argue that a domestic legislation should be prepared.  The 
Mine Action Plan,  one of the projects  of the Human Rights Association,  was aimed at 
putting the problem of landmines on the agenda of Turkey's public opinion and initiating 
relevant legal arrangements.172 Especially,  criminal liabilities of persons who violate the 
MBT's provisions and rights of victims of landmines should be included in this legislation. 
The then General Secretary of Human Rights Association, Nejat Tastan stated that a person 
who stepped on a landmine in some village in Southeastern Turkey does not have any legal  
rights  and  the  government  does  not  pay  any  compensation.  Although  free  medical 
assistance is given to landmine victims in some cities, there is no financial aid for traveling 
172 Hale Gonultas, “Insan Haklari Dernegi'nden Hayati Bir Kampanya: Mayinsiz Turkiye,” 
Express Dergisi, No. 58, February (2006).
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expenses.173 However,  if  the  victim  is  a  military  personnel,  then  the  government 
compensates the victim and grants a retirement pay along with social rights, assistance to 
find a job, and lifelong health services.  Civilian victims and their families usually have to 
rely on their own resources to recover physically and psychologically. 
Victims of landmines are also entitled to benefit the rights concluded in international 
conventions for the disabled people. On 30 March 2007, Turkey has signed the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; however, in practice the 
convention is not implemented and monitored. In 2009, Akin Birdal, Member of Parliament 
from Diyarbakir, has made a speech on behalf of the Democratic Society Party group in 
TGNA about the necessity of national mine action laws. He stated that State Parties were 
responsible  for  giving  mine  awareness  education  to  local  people,  providing  victim 
assistance  and  searching,  marking  and  clearance  of  those  lands  with  APM  risk. 
Unfortunately, Turkey did not complete these tasks to date.174 
State policies and statements of political leaders are other factors that reinforce the 
domestic impact of a norm. On different international platforms, such as the Conference on 
Disarmament or  UN General  Assembly,  Turkey has  made statements  in  support  of  the 
MBT. Furthermore, it has voted in favor of the relevant UN General Assembly resolution 
on global  landmine-ban since 1998. On 2 July 2001, before the Mine Ban Treaty was 
signed, the then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit also made statements about the necessity to 
join the treaty.175 This statement, however, was made during the unilateral PKK ceasefire, 
therefore  one  can  argue  that  the  political  environment  was  suitable  to  make  such 
declaration. 
In June 2001, with the cooperation of Physicians For Peace (USA) and Interplast 
Turkey Association, a center that to provide free prosthesis and rehabilitation service was 
established within the state Dicle University Research Hospital for victims of landmines, 
traffic accidents or patients who have atherosclerosis.176 Between 2001 and 2011, the center 
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provided prosthesis  to 101 people who had landmine accidents.177 The government also 
gave  donations  and  assistance  for  mine  clearance  to  other  countries.  In  2002,  Turkey 
donated 25000 Euro to the Partnership for Peace Programme for the destruction of the APM 
stockpile in Ukraine. In the Standing Committee Meetings in 2003, Turkey said that it has 
engaged in demining projects in various countries including Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina 
and Kosovo. In the same year, Turkish Armed Forces trained Gambia Armed Forces about 
mine clearance. 
Among the three,  however,  the most important element of domestic impact of a 
norm is the social internalization. The area of intervention of civil society in Turkey is not 
very large due to Turkey’s statist domestic structure. Still, non-state actors influence policy 
making  more  than  in  a  state-above-society  polity.  Checkel  argues  that  “[i]n  the  statist 
structure, learning by elite decision makers plays a much more dominant role in the process 
through which global norms first  reach the domestic agenda.”178 This may render NGO 
efforts ineffectual or slow down their operation in the process of norm diffusion. On the 
other hand, transnational advocacy networks can still find domestic partners, or local allies, 
to initiate a civil movement. Therefore, it is a small wonder that the internalization of mine-
ban  norm developed  after  the  Turkish  government  has  signed  the  MBT.  The  Turkish 
national ban campaign is the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT), which was formed 
in September 2000 with financial and logistical support from the Swiss Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. This NGO, which is neither an association nor a foundation, is entirely run by 
volunteers. Other human rights NGOs such as the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (IHD) 
and Turkish-German Human Rights Association had an important role in establishing the 
initiative. 
In the late 1990's, the press finally began to pay some attention to the APM issue in 
Turkey. Except the news that has been made visible by efforts of the civil society in early 
2000, the press was rather reluctant giving place to landmine incidents, especially when the 
victim was a  civilian.  When it  did give  space occasionally,  the  stories  were largely of 
177 "Talep edene Ucretsiz Protez,” NTVMSNBC, March 15, 2011. Available online: 
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economical and agricultural drawbacks the minefields have caused.179 The headline of a 
news  clip  in  2001  would  be  representative  of  the  interest  of  the  press  on  landmines: 
“Lettuce  Instead  of  Landmines.”180 Furthermore,  the  text  of  the  news,  as  many others 
published at the time, takes the landmine issue at the state level: how the mine clearance 
would positively affect Turkish-Syrian relations, how APMs were not necessary now as it 
did before 1999, and how inactive lands affect Turkish economy adversely etc. Only after 
Turkey has signed the MBT in 2003, the press gave place to news as well as columns that 
focused on the humanitarian impact of the APMs.
The Turkish advocacy network IMFT has committed itself to many aspects of the 
landmine problem. These could be listed as:
1. Pressuring the government to start a comprehensive investigation on landmines and 
the problems they cause.
2. Trying to mold public opinion.
3. Identifying the victims and their needs.
4. Preparing mine risk maps.
5. Teaching mine awareness.
6. Providing information for International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) about 
the government's compliance with the treaty.
7. Monitoring government policies 
The last two tasks are especially important because the information about casualties and 
victim assistance and, if there is,  a  violation of the treaty is reported by the IMFT to the 
Landmine Monitor—the main  compliance checking mechanism of  the global  mine ban 
movement. This information in turn enables non-governmental organizations, national or 
international,  to  hold  the  government  accountable.  When  the  new issue  of  the  Annual  
Landmine Monitor or other international materials are published, the initiative translates 
them into Turkish and sends it to relevant institutions. In September 2002, the initiative sent 
a  thousand  CDs  about  APMs  in  Turkey  to  NGOs,  members  of  the  parliament  and 
179 For an example See, Hasim Soylemez, “Mayinli Topraklar Zorunlu Nadasta,” Aksiyon, 
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municipalities close to the borders.181 The IMFT also collects information from small local 
groups, such as Hakkari Awareness Group Against APMs and Explosive Remnants of War 
and share  them on their  website.  The  IMFT also  creates  its  own information,  such as 
checking daily newspapers to find landmine related incidents or preparing mine-risk maps. 
Consequently,  the  IMFT  shares  this  information  with  the  international  landmine-ban 
campaign  network  (ICBL).  In  this  way,  the  domestic  information  is  carried  to  an 
international platform, making it more visible to everyone. 
The Turkish national landmine ban campaign distributed its first brochure and an 8 
minute video clip in August 2001, which were sent to the press and political leaders. The 
first  national  conference  on  landmines  was  organized  in  April  2003  in  Istanbul  with 
financial support from Medico International and the Swedish Campaign to Ban Landmines.
182  Although the IMFT is the primary civil actor that is engaged with the landmine issue, it  
is not the only one. The initiative's activities are endorsed and supported by various other 
NGOs, such as Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT), Human Rights Association 
(HRA), the Anti-Militarist Initiative, Diyarbakir Bar Association, Association of Displaced 
People,  Greens of  Turkey,  Ecologist  Association for a  Greener  Peace. HRA and HRFT 
regularly issues reports about victims of APMs or unexploded ordinances (UXOs).  The 
Diyarbakir  Bar  Association  provides  legal  assistance  under  the  framework  of  an  EU 
financed project, Enhancing Access to Justice in Southeastern Turkey: “Justice for All.”  On 
5 December 2004, after Turkey signed the treaty, a landmine-ban street demonstration was 
organized on Taksim's Istiklal Street, in Istanbul. This was part of a more comprehensive 
campaign of the Anti-Militarist Initiative called “We Are Confronting the Reality.”183 The 
activists mined the street with dummy APMs and carried posters with anti-APM slogans. 
Although Turkish NGOs has greatly affected how the government is engaged with 
the landmine problem and enabled popular awareness about landmines, apparently it does 
not have a direct role in Turkey's accession to the MBT. In an interview in 2001, the then  
coordinator of the IMFT says that, “Unfortunately, landmine problem can not make it to the 
political agenda in Turkey despite some progress thanks to the efforts of several NGOs. The 
181 Landmine Monitor Report. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2012.  
182 Hamza Aktan, “ Kara Bir Sorun Kara Mayini,” Bianet, April 29, 2003. 
183 Murat Celikkan “Yuzlesiyoruz,”, Radikal Daily Newspaper, December 4, 2004.  
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mine-ban campaign is run by civil society in all over the world unlike in Turkey where the 
civil  initiatives  are  rather  weak on making the government sign the  treaty.”184 Muteber 
Ogreten, the coordinator of the Initiative of Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT), makes a similar 
explanation  about  the  role  of  domestic  NGOs:  “I  do  not  think  that  civil  society 
organizations  accelerated  the  process  of  accession.  On  12  March  2003,  the  Turkish 
parliament passed the law on the issue of acceptance of the treaty and shortly before this,  
our campaign was urging the government to sign the MBT.  I say this as a joke, but if this  
had been our success, we could have said, 'we worked hard and parliament passed the law 
because of us.' In Turkey, there was no strong civil society on this issue that could make the 
parliamentary pass that law.”185 Additionally, the Turkish national mine-ban campaign has 
just been started when the Turkish government became a party to the treaty.  One possible 
reason for this fact can be the difficulty of activism in arms control and disarmament area in 
a country whose security understanding has been dominated by strong national security 
notions. If we also consider the extent of the influence of Turkish Armed Forces on the 
political life around the time Turkey has signed the MBT, it  is highly possible that the 
government would disregard a civil initiative in disarmament area. Another reason can be 
the confinement of a military subject such as disarmament to the influence of civil actors 
due to the terrorism problem. Because the APMs were used in the armed struggle against 
PKK, they may have been seen as legitimate weapons not by the army alone, but also by 
some part of the society as well. In this respect, Ogreten said “We are a small informal  
initiative but this can be due to the problem that we are dealing with. APMs can easily be 
associated with terrorism. I had been seen as a “Kurdish militant” when I  spoke about 
APMs at meetings in the Southeast region. We were only able to change this perception 
since last year. Nevertheless, wherever we go, we see positive responses from all segments 
of society.”186 A similar example can be seen at the banning of a peace conference in Ankara 
in May 1997 by the government. The meeting was banned because of the alleged 'threat' it  
posed on 'the indivisible integrity of the state.'187 A participant of the conference referred to 
184 “Koye Geri Donuste Mayin Tehlikesi,” Bianet, September 3, 2001. 
185 From the interview for this thesis. Ogreten, Muteber. Personal Interview. 17 July 2012.
186 Ibid.
187 “Turkey: A Case Study Both for “Code” and Black Market Curbs,” FAS Public Interest 
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the banning order  with  saying,  “This  was clearly not  a  goal  of  the conference,  which, 
according to the invitation letter, sought to 'silence the guns and seek through dialogue a 
solution that would allow both peoples [Turkish and Kurdish] to live in peace within the 
same  state,  with  due  respect  for  each  other's  identity  and  culture.'”188 Upon  this,  the 
participant has said she made an interview in Ankara with the coordinator of the Foundation 
for the Research of Societal Problems and asked how foreigners could participate in the 
creation of a dialogue between Kurds and Turks,  'given the high level  of sensitivity in 
Turkey to outside pressure on human rights.'189 The interviewee suggested that the efforts 
on demilitarization and disarmament should have tried to engage both the Turkish military 
and the PKK insurgents in the issue. “An attack on the beloved army [alone] will be seen as 
an attack on the state,” he said.190 
On the other hand, civil society initiatives help the internalization of the mine-ban 
norm in Turkey. Even though they did not have an effective role in the accession process,  
the tasks they do as  local allies to the transnational landmine advocacy network (ICBL), 
further facilitate the legal, political and social habituation of the norm's tenets in domestic 
laws,  policies  and  discourse.  For  example,  one  of  the  projects  of  the  Human  Rights 
Association, funded by European Union between 2006-2007, aimed to facilitate the process 
of a national mine action plan in Turkey.191 This project was especially intended to pressure 
the government to fulfill the legal obligations on APMs in accordance with the MBT. In this 
regard, Ogreten said that, “Two years ago, we talked to the Prime Minister's Administration 
for Disabled People. Interestingly, as it turned out, they learned from us that the obligations 
of the treaty was giving responsibilities to their department.”192 The importance of this task 
further increases  considering the security perceptions that hinder implementation of the 
MBT. “The high level of sensitivity in Turkey to outside pressure on human rights” requires 
Report, Journal of Federation of American Scientists, 50.4 (1997): 6.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Hale Gonultas, “Insan Haklari Dernegi'nden Hayati Bir Kampanya: Mayinsiz Turkiye,” 
Express Dergisi, No. 58, February (2006). 
192 Ogreten, Muteber. Personal Interview. 17 July 2012.
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non-governmental initiatives to take action instead of the transnational advocacy network 
(ICBL) itself. In an interview in 2006, HRA's General Secretary Nejat Tastan, told “Even 
after the accession to the MBT,193 Turkey sees the banning of APMs as a security issue and 
perceives the minefields as areas mined against the enemy. The state says there is a security 
problem and does not comment on this issue. The state has to change this point of view. 
This is not a security issue. If you perceive this as a matter of security, then it is natural not 
to tell any information. Because when you disclose the figures, some areas are revealed.”194 
These thoughts are reinforced by Ogreten's explanations: “After Turkey signed the treaty 
(2004), I had asked ten questions to General Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
National  Defense,  Ministry of  Finance  and  other  related  ministries,  using  my right  to 
information. These questions were about how much and where the mines were in Turkey. 
Each of the ministries referred me to the General Staff. The response to my questions from 
the  General  Staff  stated  that  'A  sufficient amount  of  mines  exist  in  Turkey to  provide 
security.' I objected to this answer. This was a response to me, but it did not answer my 
questions because this does not contain any information.”195 Later, she told that information 
and documents about APMs has not been made public for many years since they were seen 
as national  security or state  secrets.  She said,  however,  “This has changed lately.  Now 
information is provided. The concept of national security in Turkey is very active. I think 
we have managed to create change in spite of this fact. This is one of the most concrete  
steps taken by the Initiative...[Furthermore] At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 
Cambodia, Turkey said that it will soon establish a mine action center and the Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Defense will give mine risk education. Also, mine co-ordination 
committee was formed last  year.  All  these improvements  have taken place through the 
IMFT's efforts.”196 Another influence they had on state behavior is that the government is 
more careful now with regard to information about landmines. Ogreten said that Turkey 
now sees there is a domestic NGO in its country and it constantly monitors them. Thus, the 
193 It's  important  to  note that  the 1999 ceasefire  was over  and armed struggle was still 
continuing in 2006.
194 Hale Gonultas, “Insan Haklari Dernegi'nden Hayati Bir Kampanya: Mayinsiz Turkiye,” 
Express Dergisi, No. 58, February (2006). 
195 Ogreten, Muteber. Personal Interview. 17 July 2012.
196 Ibid.
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state cannot be inattentive when giving information because the IMFT strictly monitors 
every step they take. Therefore, Turkey is not very comfortable when reporting facts and 
figures about the status of landmines. As Ogreten said, the government presents reports 
more carefully now. She further stated that this was not the only thing that has changed. 
When  the  IMFT demanded  information  especially  about  civilian  casualties  in  reports, 
officials added the information to the report after a while. This year, she said, there was 
again  no information about  civilian  casualties  and she asked the  reason to the  Turkish 
delegates in Geneva meeting. She explains the answer as follows: “Upon this, one of them 
naively asked me 'Was there any civilian casualties this year Ms. Ogreten?' This means that 
they finally understood that there was a monitoring mechanism and they need to back up 
every bit of information they give with details. This is due to primarily because the state 
officials now understood the existence of non-governmental organizations that follow up 
this matter in their country. Because we have been monitoring them even before signing the 
MBT, I think they cannot act recklessly.”197
Another important contribution of domestic NGOs has been providing independent 
information to the transnational network to be used as progress or compliance check.198 One 
of the founders of Geneva Call,  Elizabeth Reusse-Decrey refers to this task of domestic 
NGOs in an interview with a Turkish newspaper, “According to the information available 
to us from the IMFT, Turkey's mine problem is quite serious...Local sources has expressed 
that  up  to  1000  people  died  during  the  conflict...International  non-governmental 
organizations and the Geneva Call, needs to cooperate with civil society in Turkey.”199 The 
Landmine Monitor publishes a report each year on State Parties' compliance with the treaty 
or progress on the issue. The information on countries in the reports are provided by the 
country researchers which generally belong to a national landmine ban campaign run by 
local non-governmental organizations.  The Landmine Monitor  reports on Turkey is based 
on data by the IMFT or other domestic NGOs. For example, some of the information in the 
2002-2003 report was provided by the UN Permanent Representative of Turkey and the 
197 Ibid. 
198 There are also other methods of NGOs in this regard.  According to Atwood, “Whistle 
blowing and compliance performance measures will therefore be important contributions 
of NGOs to ensuring state compliance with the intentions of the MBT.” (Atwood, 23)
199 “Turkiye Mayin Sorununu Ciddiye Almiyor,” Bianet, August 14, 2002.
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Human Rights Association.200 A small portion of the information is based on reports given 
by states  themselves  or  the  statements  they make at  international  platforms.  The  ways 
through which domestic NGOs obtain information, however, differs from the international 
campaign. Ogreten, for example, told that there is a member of parliament who supports the 
activities of the IMFT. The organization sometimes collects information from the answers 
given to  parliamentary questions that a MP asks the ministers.  Had it  not been for the 
IMFT,  the  International Campaign to Ban Landmines would not  have been  able access 
information that is collected by the various methods that local NGOs employ.
The double-checking of facts is another contribution of Turkish domestic NGOs. 
For example, in the 2002-2003 Landmine Monitor, official information was different than 
the information provided by civil initiatives in the report. According to the Human Rights 
Association (HRA), in 2002, 23 people died as a result of mine explosion and 25 people 
were injured. In the official statement of the State, however, it was reported that five people 
died  and  16  people  were  injured.201 Ogreten  told  another  similar  instance:  "I  saw 
inconsistency in the figures given and I told that to ICBL. In the meeting, ICBL asked 
Turkey the  reason of  this  discrepancy.  Turkey was  forced  to  make  a  statement  to  the 
delegation, and said, 'We are sorry, we have done the counting wrong.' This was something 
that we have uncovered.”202 Another example of contradictory information was about where 
the mines were deployed. The IMFT stated that the places where the Turkish government 
says  it  has  mined differs  from the research by civil  initiatives.203 Upon this,  the IMFT 
wanted the government to ensure the transparency required by the treaty.
In  conclusion,  Turkey  is  being  compelled  to  make  statements  in  international 
meetings  as  a  result  of  disclosure of  such contradictory situations.  Ogreten told  in  our 
interview that this led the government into thinking that it was being monitored both from 
'outside' and from 'inside'. Therefore,  local allies help political internalization of the mine 
ban norm to consolidate. In addition, through campaigns, they both spread the word and 
200 “1 Milyon Mayinla Yasiyoruz,” Bianet, September 9, 2003. 
201 Ibid.
202 Ogreten, Muteber. Personal Interview. 17 July 2012.
203 Hale Gonultas, “Insan Haklari Dernegi'nden Hayati Bir Kampanya: Mayinsiz Turkiye,” 
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remind the government of its responsibilities. This corresponds to further social and legal 
internalization of the norm. 
6.4. Conclusion
For years, Turkish governments refused to sign the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) based 
on  arguments  about  the  violation  of  borders  and  the  PKK  terrorism.  However,  in  the 
process after the arrest of Kurdish rebel leader Ocalan, the intensity of the armed conflict 
waned and there  were  hopes  that  the  terrorism problem would  be  solved soon.  It  was 
precisely  in  this  period  that  Turkey  bowed  to  pressure  from  transnational  mine  ban 
advocacy group (ICBL) and took concrete steps in accordance with the MBT. This chapter 
investigates the process through which the decision to join the MBT was made. As a result 
of  the  statist  domestic  structure  in  Turkey,  cost-benefit  calculations  of  decision-makers 
outweigh the efforts of societal actors. After a careful study, however, no causal relationship 
have been identified between domestic impact variable and diffusion of mine ban norm. On 
the other hand, another important finding is about political, social and legal internalization 
of the norm in Turkey. Societal actors, or local allies, were not strong enough to pressure 
the state to sign the MBT. Nevertheless, as the Turkish case in this thesis puts forth, they 
have a vital role in internalization of the norm in all aspects. The international campaign 
needs the cooperation of these  local allies in order to further strengthen the norm in the 
domestic  political,  legal  and social  spheres  to  influence state  behavior  in the long run. 
Finally, we can argue that this is even more important in humanitarian arms control and 
disarmament field due to its close connection with the security domain of state.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDY 3: CUBA
Cuba is one of the two countries in the Americas which have not yet signed the 
Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).204 The economic and political attrition coming from the military 
superpower of the world made Cubans go through considerable hardship, especially after 
the dissolution of  many socialist states in the world. The withdrawal of Soviet aid after the 
end of  the Cold War added more to  the already heavy burden on the shoulders  of  the 
country. Politically, while its centralized socialist system opposes any power sharing with 
alternative  political  parties  that  can  run  for  elections,  the  constitution  states  that  civil 
liberties  can  be  abandoned if  the  project  of  socialism is  at  stake.  From the  theoretical 
perspective employed in this  chapter,  its  state-above-society domestic  structure coupled 
with distant ties between the society and the state, leaves very small room if any to TANs 
and other actors to promote norms. This chapter investigates domestic impact of norms 
against landmines with respect to domestic salience and domestic structure, and the change 
in crisis level of Cuba in accordance with the end of the Cold War. 
7.1. Crisis Level
Soviet  military  and  economic  back  up  during  Cold  War  is  the  cornerstone  of 
understanding the changing crisis level of Cuba, from moderate to high levels beginning 
from early  1990's.  The  survival  of  Cuba's  state  socialist  regime relied  on  the  military 
204 The other one is United States. 
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protection and economic aid from the Soviet Union during its first thirty years. After the 
Bay of Pigs invasion, military assistance from the Soviet Union soared to the island until 
TABLE 2
Soviet Military Assistance to Cuba
SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY HARDWARE IN CUBA, 
1990
Army
Main battle tanks
Light tanks
Armored fighting 
vehicles
1.100
60
650
Navy
Submarines
Frigates
Patrol and coastal 
combatants
3
3
56
Air Force
Fighters, ground attack
Fighters
Transport aircraft
Attack helicopters
Transport helicopters
Surface-to-air missile 
sites
Training craft
156
199
82
46
123
200
89
SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA, 1990
Military advisers
Military detachment 
(brigade)
Electronic technicians 
(Lourdes)
2.800
2.800
2.100
Source: Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. Cuba After the Cold War. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. p. 72
1991.205 Cuba served as a Soviet counter-measure against US troops deployed near USSR 
territory. Thanks to this strong tie between the two, helicopters, fighter jets, ships, hundreds 
of tanks, and other military supplies and equipment were provided to Cuba. For example 
the deployment of missile bases in Cuba sparked the hottest moment in the Cold War—the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Mesa-Lago also states that “military assistance was provided 
free  because  Cuba  lacked  the  capacity  to  pay.  Almost  all  of  Cuba's  modern  military 
205 Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) was a failed initiative to overthrow Castro's socialist regime 
by a force of Cuban exiles who were funded by US government and trained by CIA.  
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equipment since 1960 came from the USSR.”206 The extent of dependency was not limited 
by military hardware and spare parts, but also included agricultural products particularly 
food and manufactured goods.207 Soviet military aid was very generous, an obvious fact 
when the Cuban army is one of the world's largest in per capita terms. According to Mott  
“from 1959 through 1979-1980 Soviet  military assistance  was  only about  $3.7  billion, 
whereas from 1981 through 1988 Moscow agreed to transfer weaponry worth $11.8 billion 
to Cuba, while other communist donors, except China, provided an additional $1.4 billion 
in weaponry.”208 Huge flow of economic and military aid during the Cold War, as can be 
seen in Table 1, was making it “difficult to envisage how Cuba could possibly survive and 
maintain its present form of government” without the Soviet Union.209 
The Soviet economic crisis during mid-1980s required a change in the policy of 
economic and military aid to Cuba.210 Given the sunken costs to shape the Cuban system, 
some Soviet officials were in favor of carrying on with the policy; but during Gorbachev's 
term,  “many  government,  military,  and  party  officials  who  had  personal  and  official 
commitments to Cuba have been replaced by people who don't care.”211 Once the Soviet aid 
became no more an option to bail out Cuba's economy from US embargo, Cuba's imports 
and exports dropped down by between 70 and 80 percent from 1990 to 1993. Between 1989 
to 1993, Cuba's GDP reduced as much as 48 percent,  and real salaries dwindled by 50 
percent.212 According to Mesa-Lago, the Soviet Union was more than a helpful ally for 
Cuba before its dissolution; “Gorbachev sought cooperation with the United States, whose 
hostility to Cuba has been a rationale for Soviet aid. Glasnost and perestroika dealt a severe 
206 Mesa-Lago,  Carmelo.  Cuba After  the Cold War.  Pittsburgh:  University of  Pittsburgh 
Press, 1993. p. 71
207 Ibid, p. 60
208 Mott,  William  H.  (2001)  Soviet  Military  Assistance:  An  Empirical  Perspective  
Greenwood Press. p. 274
209 Shearman, Peter (1987) The Soviet Union and Cuba Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 81
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blow not only to Castro's political model and Cuba's economy, but also to his reliance on 
Soviet backing for his strategy for regional security.”213 Eventually, military projects halted 
without weapons and support from the USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia.214 As a result, 
Cuba had to survive on its own security measures without relying on her former allies, 
especially the Soviet Union. Without the Soviet protection, now the effects of U.S. hostility 
was ever more apparent on Cuba. Castro's state socialism was still seen as a threat by many 
US politicians  and citizens  in  spite  of  the  dissolution  of  the  USSR.  Bill  Clinton,  then 
president  of  the  United  States,  offered  $6  billion  economic  aid  and  the  retirement  of 
Guantanamo Naval  Base personnel  if  Cuba agreed on a democratic transition.215 Cuban 
government always resisted the U.S. efforts for a regime change in Cuba, even in the face 
of strong commercial, economic, and financial embargo that has been in place since 1960.
All in all, a stagnant and weak economy, and continuous hostility and aggression 
from military superpower of the world are the primary sources that increase the crisis level 
of Cuba, leading her to retain easily affordable landmines. APMs were exclusively laid 
around U.S. Navy's base at Guantanamo Bay, circling its 18-mile border with other types of 
security devices,  such as  metal  fences  or  barbed wire.  One estimation is  that  there are 
70,000 antipersonnel and antitank mines laid on 735 acres of land.216 This naval base is 
considered to be a strategic property to US forces in the Caribbean, and also it accepts 
refugees coming from countries in the region. Since 2001, another function of the base has 
been a prison camp to many terrorism suspects, such as for Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Cuba is 
against the existence of  naval base and  the prison camp, and claims that U.S. presence on 
the  Cuban  territory  is  illegal  according  to  the  international  law.   U.S.  completed  the 
clearance of its borders in the area and replaced old “dumb” mines with smart ones (those 
that can be detonated by the personnel or on its own after a while). Cuba, having the fear of 
213 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. Cuba After the Cold War. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1993. p. 66
214 Ibid, p. 364
215 Smith, Peter H. (2000) Talons of the Eagle. Oxford University Press. p. 322
216 Roger Ricardo, Guantanamo, The Bay of Discord: The Story of the US military base in  
Cuba (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1994). 
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encountering the U.S aggression,  still  retains  APMs around the base,  giving  territorial 
defense and security as reasons to do so.217 
According to the statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “These mines also serve the military purpose of preventing US 
troops  from  expanding  with  impunity  the  perimeter  they  occupy  illegally  and  from 
launching offensive actions into the Cuban territory.”218  This clearly signals that the mines 
are understood and used as a deterrent measure against possible aggression. Even though 
the  U.S.  and  Cuba  are  not  equal  in  terms  of  military  might,  and  the  U.S  can  easily 
overthrow Castro's government through the use of force, Cuba does not want to forgo its 
landmines  and  holds  on  to  them  to  protect  the  area  that  borders  Guantanamo  Bay. 
According to Landmine Monitor 2012, in 2009 Cuba told the ICBL officials that a change 
in landmine policy is only possible with a change in U.S. policy towards Cuba, such as 
signing a peace or non-aggression agreement.219 Therefore, high level of crisis due to the 
US threat blocks the process of Cuba's accession to the treaty. This is best observed in the 
Cuba's explanation of vote about the universalisation of the Mine Ban Treaty at the United 
Nations General Assembly meeting in 1999: “Cuba would abstain on the vote, because for 
four decades it had been subject to a policy of aggression and could not afford to renounce 
the  use  of  that  weapon.  It  was  determined  to  create  a  necessary  balance  between 
humanitarian and security issues and do all possible to protect civilians from the danger of 
those weapons.”220
217 Statement by Miguel Jiménez Aday, Counselor, Embassy of Cuba in Colombia, Second 
Review  Conference,  Mine  Ban  Treaty,  Cartagena,  4  December  2009.  Notes  by  the 
Monitor. According to the US, the minefields were laid in 1983, immediately following 
the  US  invasion  of  Grenada.  Joint  Task  Force  Guantanamo,  “A historical  look  at 
Guantanamo Bay and the Northeast Gate,” www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil. 
218 Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 19 June 2000, taken from Landmine Monitor 2000.
219 Notes from ICBL meeting with Amb. Rodolfo Benítez Versón, Permanent Mission of 
Cuba to the UN in New York, 15 October 2009, taken from Landmine Monitor 2012.
220 Landmine  Monitor  Report  2000:  Toward  a  Mine-Free  World.  New  York,  NY: 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2000. 
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7.2. Domestic Impact of the Norm
Cuba is one of the few countries that have abstained from the vote on the United 
Nations General Assembly resolution passed every year to promote universalization and 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) since 1996. Throughout the years, Cuba 
attended  all  of  the  MBT meetings  as  an  observer.  Cuba's  deputy  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Maria de los Angeles Florez, stated in the December 1997 signing ceremony in 
Ottawa  that  Cuba  understands  the  humanitarian  concerns  over  the  indiscriminate  and 
irresponsible  use  of  landmines,  and  that  was  why  Cuba  actively  involved  “in  the 
negotiation  process  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Convention  on Conventional 
Weapons  (CCW) in the early 1980s.”221 Cuba is a member country of the Conference on 
Disarmament  (CD),  Organization  for  the  Prohibition  of  Chemical  Weapons,  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). Furthermore, Cuba is also a state 
party to many arms control conventions such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco).  In February 2001, Cuba invited the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) to “allow for a mutual better acquaintance between the ICBL and the 
Republic of Cuba.”222 ICBL representatives visited the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay 
and had the first chance to observe the minefields. It is believed that Cuba's state-owned 
Union of Military Industries continues to produce APMs.223 Although Cuba is party to the 
221 Maria de los Angeles Florez, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cuba, Address to the 
Ottawa Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines,  Ottawa, December 2-4, 1997 taken 
from Landmine Monitor 1999.
222 Letter to Landmine Monitor researcher Noel Stott from Juan Antonio Palacios, Director, 
Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Havana, Cuba, 5 February 
2001, taken from Landmine Monitor 2001.
223 Octavio La Vatida, “Industrias Militares en la Senda de la Eficiencia,” Granma 
Internacional, 3 September 1997. 
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CCW, it  has  not  ratified Amended Protocol  II224 on landmines  yet.  Since  1996,  Castro 
government has stated that it does not and has never exported APMs to another country in 
the past. Yet, there are no laws against production of landmines, and no moratorium or ban 
on the export of APMs. Cuba is not a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(CCM) as well. As a result, legal internalization of the norm against landmines is weak, 
though  government  policies  about  disarmament,  especially  nuclear,  is  in  line  with 
international standards, even higher than the United States. For example, Cuba has voted in 
favor of 2006 UNGA Resolution 61/89, proposal about a possible Arms Trade Treaty, as 
opposed to United States. 
As  to  political  internalization  of  the  mine-ban  norm  in  Cuba,  the  government 
provides  the  needs  of  victims  of  landmines.  Although  Cuba  does  not  participate  in 
international mine action activities, there are 2,410 Cuban doctors in Africa, the Caribbean 
and Central America working for victim assistance. Victims of landmines can benefit from 
Cuba's  free  and  universal  healthcare  system.  Furthermore,  the  Cuban  Association  of 
Physically  Disabled  Persons  (Asociacion  Cubana  de  Limitados  Fisico-Motores)  has  a 
support network that also includes victims of landmines.
On  the  other  hand,  Cuba  avoids  giving  details  about  the  use  of  weapons  to 
international institutions. The actual size and composition of Cuba's stockpile of APMs are 
unknown  due  to  the  lack  of  official  information.  A questionnaire  submitted  by  the 
Landmine  Monitor  in  order  to  learn  the  details  of  mine  use,  production,  transfer,  and 
stockpiling  was  declined  by  Cuban  government.225 Cuba's  state-above-society  domestic 
224 “Protocol  II  on Prohibitions  or  Restrictions  on the Use of  Mines,  Booby-Traps and  
Other Devices was amended on 3 May 1996 to strengthen its provisions. It extends the 
scope of application to cover both international and internal armed conflicts; prohibits 
the use of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and their transfer; prohibits the use of 
non-self-destructing  and  non-self-deactivitating  mines  outside  fenced,  monitored  and 
marked areas; broadens obligations of protection in favour of peacekeeping and other 
missions of the United Nations and its agencies; requires States to enforce compliance 
with  its  provisions  within  their  jurisdiction;  and calls  for  penal  sanctions  in  case  of 
violation.”  Convention  on  Prohibitions  or  Restrictions  on  the  Use  of  Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, http://www.un.org/millennium/law/xxvi-18-19.htm 
225 Email from Amb. Rodolfo Benítez Versón, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN, 11 
March 2011, noted that the questionnaire had been forwarded to Havana. Cuba has 
declined to provide updated information to the Monitor every year since 2003. This 
information was taken from the Landmine Monitor 2012. 
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structure  closes  the  decision-making  process  to  societal  actors.  Distant  state-society 
relationship leads to illegitimation of any movement which opposes government policies. 
However, this was not always the case. Cuba had “a strong associational activity, with deep 
historical roots and a society permeated with religious belief.”226 After the establishment of 
single-party  government,  the  state  had  the  power  to  control  counter  discourses  in  the 
society.
In Cuba, there is no national mine-ban campaign. Since there is no domestic NGO 
working  on  APMs,  the  transnational  landmine-ban  advocacy  network  (namely,  ICBL) 
cannot find an ally that will pressure the government from within to comply with the norm. 
Even  a  weak  national  mine-ban  campaign  becomes  strong,  in  terms  of  its  ability  to 
influence state compliance with the norm, when it allies with the international campaign. In 
the  case  of  Mine  Ban  Treaty,  the  international  campaign  has  a  very  institutionalized 
network that effectively monitors state compliance. This thesis argues that if there was a 
domestic NGO that supported the goals of the MBT, then the ability of the international 
campaign to influence Cuba's compliance with the norm would be higher. However, civil 
society  in  Cuba  lacks  even  the  basic  freedoms  to  organize  around  such  an  issue  like 
disarmament. Therefore, social internalization of the norm is very low. High degree state 
officials often decide and direct public agenda. Small and illegal opposition groups try to 
survive in Cuba, but they don't have access to the media. In 2005, the Assembly to Promote 
Civil  Society  in  Cuba  was  founded.  It  is  a  coalition  of  some  365  non-governmental 
organizations. Their main concerns are freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to 
form  political  parties  and  freedom  to  create  private  business.  However,  demands  for 
political rights and civil liberties fall on deaf ears in Cuba. Ladies in White (Damas de 
Blanco), for example, is a opposition group in Cuba, whose members are wives and other 
female relatives of the jailed democracy proponents. Ladies in White is criticized by Cuban 
government as being a movement of American-backed terrorists.227 According to Perez, 
“Repression causes the Cuban people to fear their  government.  Given this  fear and the 
relative easiness of leaving the country most Cubans who disagree with their government 
226 Margaret Crahan and Ariel Armony, “Does Civil Society Exist in Cuba?” Available at 
http://cubainfo.fiu.edu/Documents/CrahanDoesCivilSocietyExistInCuba.pdf.
227 "Cuba's Ladies in White released after weekend arrest”  BBC News. 19 March 2012. 
Retrieved 20 March 2012. 
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prefer 'exit' rather than 'voice'.”228 Under such circumstances, it is difficult enough for civil 
society  groups  to  gather  for  demonstration  let  alone  influencing  government  decisions 
regarding security issues of the country. Therefore, absence of a local ally is a drawback for 
ICBL to convince Cuban government about implementing the treaty. 
7.3. Conclusion
The U.S. embargo and political attrition towards Cuba, and the existence of naval 
base in Guantanamo Bay maximizes the security concerns of Cuban government.  Since 
APMs are cost effective to secure the border near the Guantanamo Naval Base, the Cuban 
government is reluctant to change policy despite strong international pressure. On top of 
high security concerns, Cuba's state-above-society domestic structure is little influenced if 
any by the civil society initiatives. Given the government's intolerance even to opposition 
groups working for social issues, the absence of domestic NGOs working for mine-ban is 
not surprising. When there are no domestic NGOs, ICBL cannot create a pressure from 
within the country and get inside information to be used against the government.  Civil 
actors often leave the country instead of raise their voice and possibly be jailed. Majority of 
the population still support the Castro government which came to power after the Cuban 
Revolution in 1953. Any social mobilization is limited and impeded by the state before it 
flourishes. Therefore, the domestic impact of the mine-ban norm is very low in Cuba. These 
two factors block the influence of ICBL, leaving the only possible way for policy change:  
elite  learning.  However,  this  also  seems  unlikely  considering  the  strained  relationship 
between Cuba and Western states. 
228 Pérez Jr., Louis A. (2003) Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy The 
University of Georgia Press. pg. 267-8
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Norm diffusion does not merely rely on agenda setting efforts of the ICBL. One of 
the findings of this thesis on the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) is that the  crisis level variable 
appeared as a factor directly blocking or giving way to the ICBL in its efforts influencing 
behavior of states towards the MBT. However, as the Turkish case showed, the domestic 
impact  of  the  mine-ban  norm does  not  have  a  causal  relationship  with  the  dependent 
variable. 
Countries
Crisis Level
Domestic Impact of 
the Norm
Implementati
on of the 
treaty
Cuba High Low -
Turkey
Before the 
ceasefire in 1999
High Low -
Turkey
After the ceasefire 
in 1999
Low Moderate +
USA High High -
Table 3. Norm Diffusion and Crisis Level Relationship in the Case of the 
Mine Ban Treaty
The  Turkish  government  finally  decided  to  join  the  MBT  after  a  careful 
investigation  of  the  Armed Forces  on  the  use  of  landmines.  When  the  armed struggle 
dramatically waned in 1999, Turkey declared that the circumstances were appropriate to 
join the MBT, despite little social pressure from within. The same applies to the US case, 
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too. The United States had the highest level of compliance with the norm. Having a liberal 
domestic structure,  policy making was open to ICBL to exert  influence.  High domestic 
impact  of  the  mine-ban  norm,  however,  was  not  sufficient  for  commitment  of  the  US 
government to the treaty.   In the case of Cuba, due to high security concerns again,  the 
Castro government  was hesitant  about  joining the MBT.  In all  of  these  cases,  security 
concerns of states slowed down the process of diffusion of the mine-ban norm. Case studies 
revealed that if the country faces a threat to its national security, ICBL can affect only the 
internalization  of  the  mine-ban  norm  with  the  help  of  domestic  civil  society  agents. 
However, once the country signs the treaty (with or without any development of the norm 
in the domestic discourse), local allies facilitate the process of internalization even in statist 
structures whose security understanding is dominated by national security discourse, as in 
the case of Turkey. Therefore, for norm internalization, independent from norm diffusion, 
local allies plays an important role. If the government is left on its own to make policy 
changes, then internalization is most likely to lag. Keck and Sikkink argues that once states 
accept an international norm, TANs can use this when the country does not comply with the 
norm in practice, employing naming and shaming techniques at the international level.229 In 
this regard, the contribution of local allies is indispensable. TANs find out inconsistencies 
between discourse and practice of the international norm by the state and provide first hand 
information. Within the country, they constantly monitor the government and ask questions. 
The Turkish case especially reveals supportive findings for this argument. The Initiative for 
a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) was monitoring and pressuring the government to take action 
in accordance with the treaty. In Cuba, a state-above-society structured polity, weak civil 
society and the government repression on civil actors create an environment in which the 
diffusion and the  internalization  of  the norm is  given up to  the government.  Domestic 
structure variable is also another factor that affected ICBL's access in three cases. This 
further supports the finding of the importance of  local allies in a country. If the political 
environment  is  not  open  to  civil  actors  and  their  elbowroom  is  too  narrow,  then  the 
influence of TANs decrease significantly. The Cuban case, in that matter, was an example 
of how the domestic structure is decisive about TANs' access into a country. Therefore, one 
of the conclusions of this thesis is that TANs will need the cooperation of  local allies to 
229 Keck, Margaret E, and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks  
in International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
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reshape the foundational norms in small  arms control field.  Information and knowledge 
sharing is the most important aspect of  a  local ally-TAN relationship. These local allies 
have first hand information due to their positions. This finding is also supported by another 
study that includes interviews with leaders of human rights NGOs.230 The circulation and 
visibility of politically important information in the international level is heavily dependent 
on the efforts of local allies and their contacts with TANs. Keck and Sikkink's Boomerang 
effect model  appears  to  be  relevant  in  humanitarian  small  arms  control  field,  too.231 
Although this is not a new finding in itself, it is worth considering its effect in small arms 
disarmament field in different countries with different domestic structures. 
Countries
Local Ally 
(Domestic NGOs)
Domestic 
Structure
Norm 
Internalization
Cuba - State-above-society Low
Turkey + Statist Moderate
USA + Liberal High
Table 4. Norm Internalization and the Presence of Local Allies relationship in 
the Case of the Mine Ban Treaty
In  the  field  of  humanitarian  arms  control  and disarmament,  global  civil  society 
actors will gain legitimacy and information in the target country due their alliance with 
domestic NGOs. After gaining domestic legimitacy,  TANs can influence the government 
policies without looking like a 'foreign meddler.' Such instances have been seen in different 
contexts. In Colombia, for example, foreign NGOs have experienced this hardship. It has 
been reported that in Colombia, 
230 Sahin,  Bican  and  Mete  Yildiz,  “Transnational  Advocacy  Networks  in  Perspective: 
Democratization,  Human  Rights  and  NGOs  in  Turkey,”  Uluslararasi  Iliskiler,  6.21 
(2009): 41-65.
231 The Boomerang effect, conceptualized by Keck and Sikkink (1998),  “The Boomerang 
model is the ideological solidarity and dense  information flows among domestic and 
international activist groups and NGOs—the main participants of transnational advocacy 
networks.” In the mine ban case,  partnerships with local NGOs are essential for TANs 
actively getting information from the countries alongside the official information they 
get from the government. 
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“the relationship between civil society organizations and the government 
has not been easy, especially for foreign NGOs. During president Alvaro 
Uribe’s term in office many were expelled. The official stance in taking 
this  decision  was  that  NGOs were  intervening  in  national  matters  and 
risking national security. In some cases the president also accused them of 
helping terrorists, or even of being terrorist agencies in disguise.”232 
As  a  policy recommendation,  this  thesis  emphasizes  the  importance  of  bilateral 
agreements between border neighbors. In the Turkish case, bilateral agreements helped the 
mine-ban norm gain more strength and led Turkey and its neighbors further comply with 
the norm even before they signed the MBT. Therefore, such agreements create possibilities 
about extending the area of norm diffusion. This thesis also reveals supportive finding for 
the efforts of including armed non-state actors in the disarmament treaties. After the end of 
the Cold War, the nature of international conflict has changed and intrastate conflicts began 
to replace interstate  conflicts.  Since the crisis  level  has an effect  on norm diffusion as 
shown in this thesis, transnational advocacy networks working in disarmament field should 
try to engage armed non-state actors in the process. To this end, Geneva Call has been 
established  ten  years  ago.  Humanitarian  engagement  of  non-state  actors  is  another 
alternative of further increasing TANs' influence in small arms control campaigns. 
Lastly, the role of transnational advocacy networks are increasing at a time when 
international negotiations take place about concluding a potential arms trade treaty. There is 
a need for alternative ways of enabling states to comply with humanitarian small arms and 
disarmament norms. As a result, studies of other factors affecting the TANs' influence will 
contribute to the field. 
232 Amaya Querejazu, "NGOs in Colombia: a long way from heaven but a little further from 
hell,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, July 22, 2011. Available online: 
http://futurechallenges.org/local/ngos-in-colombia-still-away-from-heaven-but-a-little-bit-further-from-
hell/ 
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APPENDIX
Questions for the interview with Muteber Ogreten from the Initiative for a Mine-Free 
Turkey.
ABOUT THE EXTENT OF APM USE IN TURKEY
1. Can you briefly describe the human dimension of the problem of landmines in 
Turkey? (The usage of mines in Turkey etc.)
ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL STATUS IN TURKEY ON THE SIGNING OF 
THE MINE-BAN TREATY
2. Are there other international initiatives in the field of human security which Turkey 
is a part of?
3. Were there any laws in domestic law relating to land mines in Turkey before its 
accession to the Mine Ban Treaty?
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
TO THE PROCESS OF SIGNING OF THE MINE-BAN TREATY 
4. Can you briefly tell how the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey has formed?
5. Were there any local non-governmental organizations active in this field before 
Turkey signed the Treaty?
6. Do you think that local NGOs in Turkey have played an active role in the accession 
process? If so, what were their roles and contributions?
7. Do you think that international NGOs in the world have played an active role in the 
accession process? If so, what were their roles and contributions?
ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL STATUS IN TURKEY ON THE SIGNING 
OF THE MINE-BAN TREATY
 
8. What is the relationship between the problem of terrorism in Turkey and the use of 
anti-personnel landmines?
9. Following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK declared a ceasefire between 
1999 and 2004. Do you think the hopes for peace in this period gave impetus to the 
signing of the Treaty?
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